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ABSTRACT
The Problem of Prayer in School: A Discussion of Legal Interpretation and Policy
By
Staci Lynn Brick
Dr. Jerry Simich, Examination Committee Chair
Associate Professor of Political Science
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
The problem of prayer in public schools is a divisive one that has grown out of a
changing and confusing interpretation of the Establishment Clause with respect to school
activities. Traditionally and historically, the United States has recognized public praise
of God in a nonsectarian manner; however, this type of religious activity has been
deemed unconstitutional in the school setting. The United States Supreme Court has
also allowed public financial support of religion while vehemently disallowing symbolic
religious support in public schools. The accomodationists on the Court has prevailed in
most venues except school, where the separationists have managed to force a wedge
between religious practice and the school setting. This varying interpretation of the
Establishment Clause that is dependent on the time, place, and manner of government
support has created a maze of incongruent, incomprehensible precedent that has denied
the democratic nature of the American system of government. Some simple changes in
policy toward state-endorsed religious activities could restore the American school to its
traditional and democratic purpose in regards to religious education.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
Many of the colonies that gave birth to the United States were founded for
religious freedom by religious zealots. This paradox is fundamental to the religious
tradition in the United States. The First Amendment of the Constitution starts, “Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof.” (United States Constitution) When the government hires chaplains to minister
to military persoimel, excuses practitioners of the Jewish faith from school or from
government jobs on Jewish holidays, or allows religious student organizations to meet
and to teach on public school campuses, these clauses may even come into direct conflict
with each other. (Center for Civic Education 1999) One of the most controversial clashes
between the clauses began in 1962 with the Supreme Court decision in Engel v. Vitale
(370 U.S. 421). The war continues though the constitutional battlegrounds have changed,
and the opinion of the majority of Americans has consistently been squarely opposed to
the decisions of the Court. (Green and Guth 1989; Jacoby 1990; Servin- Gonzalez and
Torres-Reyna 1999) Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s right and duty to make
unpopular decisions when called upon to do so by the principles of the Constitution, the
decisions regarding school prayer seem out of step not only with the democratic nature of
the United States but also with the interpretation of the Establishment Clause in regard to
other areas in which religion and state often commingle.
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Literature Review

Since 1962, scholars have noted the diversity of interpretation to which the
Establishment Clause is subject, especially in regard to issues involving schooling.
Modem Court opinions on prayer in public school seem to follow a natural progression
from Engel v. Vitale in 1962 (370 U.S. 421) to 2000’s Santa Fe Independent School
District v. Doe (530 U.S. 290). Each case in the progression further restricts prayer on
school grounds and at school-sponsored activities. Where the Court begins to contradict
itself is in aligning these prayer cases with other types of Establishment Clause cases,
such as school funding or public display cases. This should come as no surprise to a
student of the Court, since Establishment Clause interpretation in these areas seems
inconsistent and mired in lists of exceptions to constitutional rules.
Prior to 1947, the Establishment Clause had no bearing on school prayer or
funding, because that part of the Constitution applied only to the federal government.
(Everson v. Board o f Education 330 U.S. 1) Writing in 1951, Lynford Lardner described
the inherent problems with Establishment Clause interpretations, including problems
interpreting the wording of the clause, problems of tradition and custom, and problems
defining the extent of the limitation on Congress. (Lardner 1951) All of these problems
were at least exacerbated by the incorporation of the provision to the states, which then
had to consider their own constitutions as well as their traditional or ceremonial practices.
The Everson decision fundamentally altered powers of the several states with
regard to government involvement in religion and complicated the interpretation of the
establishment clause. Since the time of colonial occupation of North America by the
British, colonies or states had controlled religious freedom and toleration statutes. Early
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in the history of the United States, several key founders had argued that religious matters
were to be handled by these smaller units of government, since they were closer to the
people. The federal government, however, has been steadily increasing its power over
the state governments at least since the end of the Civil War, and the national government
has exerted a steady stream of increasing influence over protections of individual rights
and matters of religion. National laws aimed at defense and education purposes have a
significant effect on religious practices within states, even though the aims might be
secular. Walfi-ed Peterson argued in 1963 that national legislation and case law
concerning religion exert a pressure for uniformity and caused conflict when state and
local agencies acted in defiance of national policy in order to protect their own traditions.
(Peterson 1963)
As the Supreme Court set to the task of defining the Establishment Clause for
application to state governments, it was clear to William Van Alstyne that the definition
given from case to case was incoherent. At first, he claimed, the Court’s view was overly
restrictive while at the same time making an exception for the parochial school aid
program in question, such as in Everson (1947, 330 U.S. 1) in which the Court purported
to establish a strict separation between church and state while still allowing the state to
bus students to parochial schools. Uncomfortable with the dismissal by the Court of
pertinent historical argument. Van Alstyne suggested that the Court needed to interpret
the Establishment Clause in light of the Free Exercise Clause. He argued that the two are
complementary rather than contradictory, and that the Court could abandon some of its
more confusing and disturbing arguments by interpreting the two clauses as one
provision. (Van Alstyne 1963)
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William Carroll agreed that Establishment Clause interpretation lacks consistency
from case to case, even resulting in a rare Court occurrence; the overturning of a
previously established precedent when the Zorach (1952,343 U.S. 306) case overturned
a Court restriction, set only a few years previously, against release time for students for
the purpose of religious education. Carroll argued that the broad interpretation of the
Establishment Clause as meaning that the state can in no way support religious activity is
unwieldy and unrealistic. In order to counteract this, the Court has developed a system of
exceptions to the rule. These exceptions revolve mainly around the concepts of state
neutrality, fi-ee exercise, and secular purpose. The last of the tests presents the biggest
problem in Establishment Clause interpretation and may result in the nullification of
some laws that protect free exercise. Carroll suggested that the Court develop a
definition for “religion” that is suitable for both the Free Exercise and the Establishment
Clauses since the Court appears to be using a different definition for each. In order for
one definition to be equally applicable, it must include belief and non-belief. (Carroll
1967)
A 1985 study of school prayer supporters by Elifson and Hadaway identified
school prayer as a particularly religious and political issue, particularly salient to older
Southern Protestant with little education. Supporters of school prayer tended to be more
likely to be conservative also. Though a majority of the United States approves of prayer
in public school. Congress has failed in its attempts to create a constitutional amendment.
According to the study, this failure may be attributable to the difficulty inherent in
writing an amendment that would be acceptable to the many disparate Christian groups
on the school prayer bandwagon. This is a problem in the wider school prayer issue, as
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these groups may agree, conceptually, that there should be a prayer, but argue over how
the prayer should be written and or delivered. Many challenges to school prayer
activities have come from persons of faith objecting to the wording, style, or delivery of
the prayer in question. Also, since these groups tend to come from less politically
powerful demographic groups, allowing Congress to get by on mere lip service to the
amendment movement. (Elifson and Hadaway 1985)
One of tiie reasons for the continued discontent among the American public is the
perception of challengers to school prayer activities as members of marginal religious
sects. Though this perception may be largely false when it comes to school prayer, a
1983 study by Way and Burt found some Court bias in favor of marginal religious sects.
Between 1970 and 1980, Establishment and Free Exercise Clause challenges made my
members of marginal sects, those religions not associated with a Judeo-Christian
tradition, were successful over 55% of the time, while challenges brought by mainline
Protestant succeeded only 34% of the time, with slightly higher success rates for
Catholics and litigants of Jewish faith. According to Way and Burt, this alarming trend
shows the willingness of the Court to set aside the rights of the majority of religious
people in order to protect the rights of those of marginal faiths when they come into
conflict. (Way and Burt 1983) In fact, in discussions of school prayer, even in Court
opinions, it is the respect for the views of those of marginal religious sects that often
causes the Court to reject any notion of school-sponsored prayer activity.
In 1985, Frank Way suggested that the way to stabilize the issue of Establishment
Clause interpretation was to shift power back to communities. Prior to Engel, courts
upheld public piety statutes on the basis of old blasphemy precedent, deference to
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legislatures, and démocratie values. Also, states deciding the constitutionality o f school

prayer, resolved the issue in single cases, 75% of which were unanimous, that were never
appealed. Of twenty-three states that made prayer decisions, 16 upheld the prayers, 5
struck them down, and two called for excuse mechanisms. (Way 1985)
A. James Reichley in 1986 contended that a Court, overly reliant on the Free
Exercise Clause, had abandoned the tradition of acceptable government
acknowledgement of religion in its interpretation of the Establishment Clause. His
argument relied on references to the founders and to Alexis De Toqueville. Reichley did
not claim that religion itself was the foundation of democracy, just that moral values,
difficult to separate from religion itself, provided a foundation for democracy. (Reichley
1986)
Leonard Levy, writing in the same year, contended that the founders intended, as
the Court had solidified, to create a wall of separation between church and state, such that
neither should interfere with the other. Levy argued that, based on the historical record,
the founders intended a broad view of both the religion clauses, in order to prevent the
kinds of religious persecution with which they were too familiar. Even support of
religion in general by federal or state governments would be clearly proscribed by this
view of the clauses. School prayer, though it may not favor any denomination or may not
be coercive, would fall under this general support category and be unconstitutional in
Levy’s view. (Levy 1986)
Green and Guth’s study of political activists explained the distance between
Congress, the Courts, and the public on the issue of school prayer, as one attributable to
the deep divide among political activists on the issue of school prayer. The general
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public seems to maintain a consistent majority in favor of school prayer tiiat does not
exist among political activists. Activists, by definition are more involved in participation
in government processes, providing a vital link between the people and their governing
bodies. Activists are often also more informed about constitutional issues and about the
inner workings of government institutions than are members of the general public.
Among this group, there is a clear majority against school prayer. (Green and Guth
1989)
Much debate in the area of Establishment Clause interpretation revolves around
the intent of the Framers of the amendment, especially James Madison. Answering
accomodationists who had made claims that Madison was accommodating of religious
practices as a fiumer, a Congressman, and a president, Thomas Lindsay reexamined
Madison’s writings to argue that he was grudgingly accepting of only the most peripheral
role of government in religious practice. Madison, after all, was a practical politician,
faced with the same democratic pressures and deliberative processes that modem
politicians face. Madison, however, was clearly dismayed at the public outcry for days of
prayer and fasting during the War of 1812, and issued such ceremonial declarations only
to quell the fiiror, insisting that he would never prescribe the manner in which these days
would be observed or insist on observation at all. Madison later cringed at the fact that
he felt forced to make the suggestion of days of prayer and fasting at all. Lindsay 1991)
A recent survey by Servin-Gonzales and Tores-Reyna in 1999 indicated that
public support for a school prayer amendment depended directly on the amount of
information respondents were given. The general public, given no information,
consistently showed majorities in favor of prayer. When informed of the restrictions of
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the Establishment Clause or when it was implied that public school prayer would restrict
the rights of parents to teach their children their own religious beliefs, support for the
amendment was low. This may indicate that the general public wishes to support prayer
but has little background knowledge of the purpose, meaning, and implications of the
constitutional law surrounding the subject. (Servin-Gonzales and Torres-Reyna 1999)

The Problem
In the debate over the acceptability of prayer in public school, there are at least
two easily definable opponents, and each side defines the problems associated with
school prayer differently. Those who approve of school prayer see a problem with the
deterioration of moral values and traditions in the American democracy. They also
identify a broad interpretation of the Establishment Clause by the Supreme Court as a
problem that must be overcome and see the obstruction of state-sponsored school prayer
as a violation of the concept of federalism. School prayer opponents believe that
constitutional principles are at stake when a state sponsors a prayer. They argue that
separation between church and state must be maintained in order to protect believers and
non-believers fi-om undue state coercion in the area of religious beliefs. Both sides
recognize inherent problems in the inconsistent interpretation of the salient constitutional
clauses by the Supreme Court.
Those who believe that prayer in school is acceptable and fundamental to a
solidly founded community find themselves aligned with a great tradition that spans from
Plato (The Republic Book III) through Tocqueville (Democracv in America Volume 1
Part 2 Chapter 9) and beyond. Though some may disagree with the validity of this
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philosophical tradition, a study by the Brookings Institution in 1985 found the argument
for the religious foundations of democracy compelling at least. The study indicated some
correlation between decline in religious activity and the increase in anti-social behavior
such as crime, cynicism, and mistrust of social institutions. (Reichley) This side of the
argument is largely defined by the concept that moral education, through school prayer,
will lead to a safer and more stable society. The problem, as defined by the pro-prayer
group, also called religious accomodationists, is that prayer in school is a necessary
component of democracy and vital to the continuation of a free society.
Tradition is also a key focus of the pro-prayer debaters. Justice Potter Stewart, in
his dissent in Engel v. Vitale (370 U.S. 421), argued that school prayer is part of the
heritage of the nation and that to deny the prayer would be to deny students a key part of
American tradition. To this effect, he extensively footnoted references to God in
accepted government activities, presidential speeches, and the Declaration of
Independence. To the supporters of school prayer, this helps to define another problem
meant to be answered by the use of a non-denominational non-coercive prayer in school,
the disappearance or lack of tradition in the United States.
Federalism may also be at stake when the Supreme Court denies the right of a
state to adopt a sponsored prayer. Many accomodationists point out that the First
Amendment was written originally to limit the federal government only, as indicated by
use of the word “Congress” at the outset of the Amendment. It was not meant to restrict
the states, each having its own constitution and religious practices. (Peterson 1963) The
Supreme Court, guided by the Fourteenth Amendment, changed the relationship between
the states and the federal government with the decision in Everson v. Board o f Education
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(330 U.S. 1), giving the federal government more power over church-state relations.
Most accommodationists would argue that this fundamental change to the clause is an
attack on the rights of states. (Peterson 1963)
Constitutionally, the accomodationists focus more on the importance of the Free
Exercise Clause and on a narrow interpretation of the Establishment Clause. In 1985, the
Supreme Court struck down a mandated moment of silence for prayer in Alabama
schools simply because the statute mentioned prayer as one of many student activities
that could take place during that moment. (Wallace v. Jaffree 472 U.S. 38) The Court
interpreted the list of activities as a list of endorsed activities that should take place
during the moment of silence, thereby placing the government stamp of approval on
religious practice. In his dissent. Chief Justice Warren Burger relied mainly on an
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause that would allow each student to practice his or
her own religious beliefs, which would enjoy recognition and support by the school.
Justice William Rehnquist dissented based on a traditional interpretation of the
Establishment Clause that limited the effect of the clause to outright and obvious support
of a specific religious belief or sect by the federal government. The accomodationists see
the problem as one of allowing Free Exercise of religious beliefs within the constraints of
the Establishment Clause.
Accomodationists share many demographic factors. School prayer advocates are
more likely to be Southern, older, Christian, blue-collar workers with educational
backgrounds often limited to the completion of high school. (Green and Guth 1989)
These demographics correlate well with the demographics of the Republican party, so it
may come as no surprise that the Republican party platform has consistently contained a

10
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plank regarding a proposed School Prayer Amendment. (Janda 1999) A solid and stable
majority of the American public defines the problem of school prayer from the
accomodationist perspective. (Green and Guth 1989; Jacoby 1990; Servin- Gonzalez and
Torres-Reyna 1999) Therefore, the problem cannot be limited to either side of the
political aisle, although prayer may be one of many religious issues that have swung
congressional majorities and even the presidency into the hands of Republicans.
People who do not support prayer in school define the problem in a much
different manner. They rely on a broad interpretation of the Establishment Clause as first
clearly delineated in the case of Everson v. Board o f Education (330 U.S. 1) which
incorporated the Establishment Clause to the states. Though there are exceptions, the
rule is basically defined as follows:
The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at
least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws that aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a pemon to go to or
to remain away fi-om church against his will or force him to profess a
belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church
attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be
levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may
be called, or whatever from they may adopt to teach or practice religion.
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly,
participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice
versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of
religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between Church
and State.' {Everson v. Board o f Education 330 U.S. 1)
The separationists believe that there are fundamental constitutional values at stake that
have just as fine a tradition as the philosophical one claimed by the accomodationists.
This tradition springs fi*om the years of religious persecution and war in Europe and in
the early colonies. This history is referenced in Justice Hugo Black’s decisions in both

11
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Everson (330 U.S. 1) and Engel v. Vitale (370 U.S. 421). For those opposed to statesponsored prayer, non-belief holds and should maintain the same level of protection as
any religious belief. (Carroll 1967) Therefore, one problem associated with prayer in
school includes the danger of religious persecution or subtle coercion of non-believers.
It would be folly to suggest that separationists are all atheists, agnostics, or
secular humanists. (Green and Guth 1985) In fact, the recent Texas suit regarding
student-led prayer prior to football games was commenced by a Catholic and a member
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints. (Santa Fe Independent School
District v. Doe 530 U.S. 290) Many fear that a close relationship between church and
state is as harmful to religious practice as it is to state secular goals. (Van Alstyne 1963)
People who disagree with state-sponsored prayer in school see a problem with the overt
entanglement between state and religion. In the case of Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court
incorporated this definition of the problem into the official test for Establishment Clause
cases. (401 U.S. 192)
The main difference in problem definition lies in the accepted method of
Establishment Clause interpretation for each side. Accomodationists read the clause
narrowly to allow non-denominational, non-coercive prayer, while separationists read the
clause broadly to disallow any support of religion by the government, including any kind
of recognized prayer activity. If the Court were consistent in its application of the
Establishment Clause, it would give both sides an interpretation to agree on, but
arguments continue based on many inconsistencies. Though the Court’s definition in
Everson (330 U.S. 1) seemed like a steadfast rule, the justices immediately started to
riddle the rule with exceptions. (Carroll 1967) The opinion in Everson actually

12

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

supported state funded busing to private schools. Since then, the Court has allowed
release time for religious education (Zorach v. Clauson 343 U.S. 306), public school
teachers providing secular education in private schools (Agostini v. Felton 521 U.S. 203),
and even direct public payment to private schools (Zelman v. Simmons-Harris 536 U.S.
639). At the same time, the Court has prohibited non-denominational, non-coercive
school prayer (Engel v. Vitale 370 U.S. 421), a mandated moment of silence for prayer
(Wallace v. Jaffiee 472 U.S. 38), ceremonial prayer at graduation (fee v. Weisman 505
U.S. 577), and student-led ceremonial prayer at the beginning of school sporting events
(Santa Fe Independent School District v. DOE 530 U.S. 290). If the problem is the
ceremonial usage of religious ceremony in government sponsored activity, it is difficult
to understand how the Court has allowed the use of the national motto, “In God We
Trust,” on all U.S. currency, and chaplains in state and national legislative sessions.
(Engel V. Vitale 370 U.S. 421) Both sides can recognize the major problem with school
prayer policy in the United States is inconsistency in Establishment Clause interpretation
on the part of the Court.

13
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CHAPTER 2

THE HISTORY OF ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE INTERPRETATION
Because of the prohibition of the First Amendment against the enactment
of any law ‘respecting an establishment of religion,’ which is made
applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, state officials may
not compose an official state prayer and require that it be recited in the
public schools of the State at the beginning of each school day - even if
the prayer is denominationally neutral and pupils who wish to do so may
remain silent or be excused from the room while the prayer is being
recited.
Justice Hugo Black’s decision in Engel v. Vitale (370 U.S. 421) did more than end a
practice of religious prayer in New York’s public schools, it touched off a wave of
controversy that has stretched into the twenty-first century. Nationwide, school districts
tried to maneuver around this new, broader interpretation of the Establishment Clause.
Solutions ranged from moments of silent prayer and reflection (Wallace v. Jaffree 472
U.S. 38) to ceremonial prayer at graduation (Lee v. Weisman 505 U.S. 577) to student-led
prayer at extracurricular activities (Santa Fe Independent School District v. DOE 530
U.S. 290). None of these solutions was acceptable to the Court, and many school
districts simply act in defiance of the Court’s decisions, silently hoping that no parent
will bring legal action.
Much of the reason behind the search for loopholes and the acts of defiance can
be found in the changing and inconsistent interpretation of the Establishment Clause
itself. Its reluctant author, James Madison, penned the clause as a part of a broader

14
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statement of rights that he had promised to the Anti-Federalists in order to secure
ratification of the Constitution. Citizens, to be sure, would be protected from a formal
declaration of a national religion. (Annals I: 729-731) The new government had in fact
grown out of colonies, some of which had been established solely for the purpose of
freeing these new settlers from the bounds of established religions in Europe, therefore
many citizens under the new Constitution thought it necessary to enact such a barrier
between the matters of church and those of state. (Engel v. F i f / a / e 370 U.S. 421) The
original interpretation of the clause, however, restricted only national governments and
did not seem to prohibit some ceremonial sponsorship of religion in general. Through the
Court’s doctrine of incorporation, the Establishment Clause was applied to the states in
1947 in the case o f Everson v. Board o f Education. (330 U.S. 1) Since then, the special
relationship between schools and religion has created a murky area of constitutional law.
There are three general methods of interpretation used by Supreme Court justices,
and even scholars within these three schools differ in their interpretation of this
seemingly simple statement in the First Amendment. The first method involves searching
for the literal meaning of the words of the clause being interpreted, the second relies on
the intent of the Framers of the provision, and the third involves the application of timehonored constitutional principles to modem problems. Some justices, typically described
as conservative or restraintist, look to the words of the provision for insight into the true
meaning and application of the clause to modem situations while others comb the
historical record for clues as to the true intentions of the Framers of the Amendment.
(Levy 1986) More liberal justices, often accused of being activist, take an evolutionary
approach, viewing the Constitution as a living document, the principles of which must be

15
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shaped to match the changing needs of a new society. (Scalia 1998) Each method of
interpretation has its flaws, and each presents a special challenge in Establishment Clause
cases, which are often further complicated by the interplay between that clause and it’s
sister, the Free Exercise Clause.
As a result of the different methods of interpretation, the changing makeup of the
Court, and the continuous pull of public opinion, the Court has created a maze of
definitions of the Establishment Clause, and many modem cases involving establishment
of religion contradict each other or contradict precedent. The most glaring inconsistency
comes in the application of the Establishment Clause to school prayer. Following a
broad, evolutionary interpretation, the Court has stmck down any and all forms of
government sponsored prayer in schools while allowing the government to sponsor the
use of chaplains in state and national governments as well as the ceremonial use of
religion on currency, and in patriotic songs sung in the school environment. {Engel v.
Vitale 370 U.S. 421) They have disallowed use of prayer in extracurricular activities
(Santa Fe Independent School District v. DOE 530 U.S. 290) while allowing religious
clubs to meet on campus with a school advisor (BOE ofWestside Community Schools v.
Mergens 496 U.S. 226) and direct monetary payments to private schools by the state.
(Zelman v. Simmons-Harris 536 U.S. 639) As the Court moves to narrow the scope of
the Establishment Clause in terms of monetary support to religious institutions, it has
broadened the interpretation of state support in terms of prayer in school
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Church-State Relations in a Republic
When the first known republic was established by the Greeks, there was no call
for the separation of church and state activities. Early political philosophers found the
two concepts inextricably tied together, and saw religion as a key function of the state. In
The Republic. Plato lays out the design for a model government in which education must
be the foundation for the state. Crucial to this state education was a common set of
values taught to all children through the use of religious tales. (Plato The Republic Book
III) Aristotle, writing many years after Plato, thought religion to be a necessary function
of the state in order for the community to survive. (Aristotle Politics Book VII; viii)
Classical republicans believed that the serenity of the state rested in part on uniformity in
morality and civic goals, and that in order to achieve that uniform morality, religion
should be supported by the state.
When the Roman Republic fell to its own imperialism, the early age of republics
disappeared and was replaced by a new age of authoritarian rule. State sponsorship of
religion in many parts of Europe gave way to religious sponsorship of the state. The
Romans persecuted Jews and Christians; the Christians, separated in two sects, forced
non-Christians into Eastern Europe where ethnic tension raged. Christians, Jews, and
Muslims fought Holy Wars over sacred land, and the fire of expansionism was fueled by
religious fervor. Popes and kings struggled with each other for power. Religion
corrupted the state, and the state sullied religion. (Ellis, E. and Esler, A. 1999)
It was this unholy alliance between church and state, coupled with the rebirth of
classical learning that led to the Reformation, the revolt against the Catholic Church in
Western Europe. Whereas the Renaissance had led to the questioning of religious beliefs
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in matters of science, the Reformation invited inquisitive souls to seek their own
salvation without assistance from church or state. It was from this revolutionary chain of
events that the predecessor to the American ideology was bom. Enlightenment
Philosophy. People began to see themselves as autonomous individuals who could seek
their own salvation and make their own decisions regarding their govemance through the
power of logic with which each man had been gifted at birth. (Ellis, E. and Esler, A.
1999)
Many Protestant faiths faced persecution in Europe and fled to the American
colonies in order to escape the established churches of the old world. However, many of
those settlers created similarly entangled governments once they had created a
homogeneous community of their own, and their colonial charters reflect this urge to
sanctify their own colonial governments. (Center for Civic Education) Some Protestant
leaders, however, recognized a need for the some distinction, though not a clear one,
between church and state powers. John Calvin, a Protestant founder whose followers
faced discrimination in many parts of Northem Europe, wrote:
Nor let anyone think it strange that I now refer to human polity the charge
of the due maintenance of religion, which I may appear to have placed
beyond the jurisdiction of men. For I do not allow men to make laws
respecting religion and the worship of God now, any more than I did
before; though I approve of civil government, which provides that the true
religion which is contained in the law of God, be not violated and polluted
by public blasphemies with impunity. (Calvin 1536)
The Protestant distinction between the sphere of government and the sphere of religion
seemed to depend on the homogeneous or heterogeneous situation in which they found
themselves. More bluntly, it may have simply depended upon who held power.
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Most importantly, the Enlightenment period marked a return to democratic ideas.
John Locke, a British philosopher who bristled at the king’s claim to divine right, may be
the most influential philosopher from the period. Locke’s essay on religious tolerance
details a type of separation of church and state in which each individual would be
responsible for his own path to salvation; therefore, it was not the duty of the government
to enforce religious precepts on the people. Judging by Locke’s last several paragraphs,
however, there must be some role for the government, because he believes that Catholics
and atheists are not to be tolerated by any government. Locke wrote:
That church can have no right to be tolerated by the magistrate which is
constituted upon such a bottom that all those who enter into it do thereby
ipso facto deliver themselves up to the service and protection of another
prince.. .Lastly, those are not to be tolerated who deny the being of a God.
Promises, covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human society,
can have no hold upon an atheist. (Locke 1689[1983])
In his Second Treatise on Government. Locke wrote extensively about the beginning and
nature of human society. He theorized that even in a state of nature in which no
government exists, there is a law, which is handed down by God and that God grants all
people with rights to life, liberty, and property. The purpose of the government is to
protect those God-given rights. (Locke 1689(1983]) Therefore the Enlightenment and
the Reformation gave birth to the idea of a separation of church and state, but the
separation was never meant to be a strict one, nor was the idea commonly practiced over
much of Europe.
This history and philosophy is directly reflected in the founding documents of the
United States. Many of the colonial charters in the American colonies referred to a duty
to God. For example, under a listing of capital laws in The Body of Liberties of the
Massachusetts Colonie of New England, is written, “If any man after legal conviction
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shall have or worship any other god, but the lord god, he shall be put to death.” (1641)
The Declaration of Independence nearly quotes Locke’s natural rights philosophy as well
as referencing God in several sections. It ends, “And for the support of this Declaration,
with a firm reliance on the protection of the divine Providence, we mutually pledge to
each other our Lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor.” (1776) After the states gained
independence and wrote their own Constitutions, many of them seemed to reflect the
separation of church and state suggested by the religious reformers, but with the same,
seemingly mixed message of partial support of religion by the government. The Virginia
Declaration of Rights states:
That Religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of
discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force
or violence; and, therefore, all men are equally entitled to the free exercise
of religion, according to the dictates of his own conscience; and that it is
the mutual duty of all to practice Christian forbearance, love and charity
towards each other. (1776)
This tradition of walking the fine line between government support of public morality in
the form of religion and allowing people the right to exercise religion freely has
obfuscated the standing case law in regards to participation in religious activity in school.
As A. James Reichley puts it
Historically, there is no doubt that religion played an important, perhaps
indispensable, part in the development of democratic ideas and
institutions, first in Europe and Âen in America. Some political theorists
argue, however, that once these institutions are in place, they can be
maintained on the basis of purely secular values. Others, supporting the
beliefs of the Founders, contend that if values derived from religion are
removed, the moral pillars on which democracy stands will crumble.
(1986)

20

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Education in America
The history of education in the United States presents a new challenge to the
separation of church and state. Originally, schools were church run, and the purpose of
education on the American continent was to prepare students for life in the religious
community. Much of this education focused on Bible reading and study, and higher
levels of education were created to prepare young boys for a future in becoming
ministers. (Boyers, et al 1996) Eva Brann writes.
With respect to the colleges, my main concern, there were no strictly
private schools in this country in the early days. The colonial colleges
were financed botii from public and private sources; sectarian and secular
influences were thoroughly entangled with each other. (Brann 1979)
Initially, religion and education were inexorably tied, and the state intermingled funding
and land grants to these church sponsored institutions of learning. The Northwest
Ordinance solidified this role of the government in education by requiring that each new
state that joined the Union would be required to set aside a certain amount of land to the
support of public education. (Northwest Ordinance 1787)
Thomas Jefferson, who is often seen as a guiding philosopher in the area of
church and state, was also an advocate of publicly funded education for all citizens.
Jefferson developed an idea of schooling in which small communities would run and
fund conununity schools in which students would be prepared to serve the community.
Many aspects of his plan reflected the classical republican philosophies of the early
Greeks. Even Jefferson, who is famous for his Deist perspective and attempt to remove
all superstitious and supernatural references from the Bible, recognized the need to allow
religious practice in the public schools. In an 1825 letter to Arthur Spicer
Brockenborough, Jefferson wrote:
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In the Rockfish report it was stated as probable that a building larger than
the Pavilions might be called for in time, in which might be rooms for a
library, for public examinations, and for religious worship under such
impartial regulations as the Visitors should prescribe, the legislature
neither sanctioned nor rejected this proposition; and afterwards, in the
Report of Oct 1822. the board suggested, as a substitute, that the different
religious sects should be invited to establish their separate theological
schools in the vicinity of the University, in which the Students might
attend religious worship, each in the form of his respective sect, and thus
avoid all jealousy of attempts on his religious tenets, among the
enactments of the board is one looking to this object, and superseding the
first idea of permitting a room in the Rotunda to be used for religious
worship, and of undertaking to frame a set of regulations of equality and
impartiality among the multiplied sects. I state these things as manifesting
the caution which the board of Visitors thinks it a duty to observe on this
delicate and jealous subject, your proposition therefore leading to an
application of the University buildings to other than University purposes,
and to a partial regulation in favor of two particular sects, would be a
deviation from the course which they think it their duty to observe..
(Jefferson [1825] 1983)
Though Jefferson did go on to suggest that it might be easier for students to attend
churches in a nearby community, he did not indicate any disapproval of the board’s
suggestions regarding ftie provision of a building for religious worship on the
University’s grounds, and seemed to support the idea that the problem with his friend’s
plan was the support of specific sects. This would support the accomodationist view that
government could support religious practice in general while not granting special
privileges to certain sects.
As the nation expanded and the government took on more roles, states began to
provide public education for all students. Many of these states developed compulsory
attendance laws that forced students to attend school between certain ages. The demands
of the Industrial Revolution and of the increasing complexity of American public life
required that the youth in America be provided with compulsory education in order to be
effective citizens. (Arends 1998) Schools never entirely separated themselves from
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their history of religious instruction. Until the 1960s, most states maintained traditions of
prayer in school and devotional Bible reading. Many of these activities went
unchallenged in the United States, because the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment applied only to the federal government, but the case of Everson v. Board o f
Education (330 U.S.l) changed that and incorporated the clause into the fundamental
liberties covered by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The sheer
weight of amicus curiae briefs filed by other states in support of New York in the case of
Engel V. Vitale (370 U.S. 421) and in support of the state of Maryland in the case of
Abington School District v. Schempp (474 U.S. 203) prove the fact that many states had
retained tradition carried over fi-om the religious foundations of education in the U.S.

Intent of the Framers
Legal scholars who interpret the Constitution by seeking the intent of the original
writers of key clauses and sections search legal record for the true meaning of the
Establishment Clause in relation to the problem of school prayer. (Scalia 1998) This type
of interpretation allows a consistent set of beliefs about the fundamental principles of the
American government. An interpretation of this type could provide clear case law which
might stand the test of time, leading to a more consistent set of laws within the United
States. Seeking the intent of the Framers can be an arduous process, however, and may
be fraught with a new set of interpretations. Even experts in Framers’ intent can disagree
on the final definition of a provision in light of the historical record. Furthermore, many
of the Framers disagreed amongst themselves, and this type of interpretation often relies
on the journals and notes of one or two key Framers, such as James Madison. (Levy
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1986) As Justice David Souter notes in his concurrence on Lee v. Weisman (505 U.S.
577), “the Framers simply did not share an understanding of the Establishment Clause.”
Newer amendments are interpreted through the scope of congressional debate records,
but those records may not reflect the full range of discussion and disagreement that
occurred over the provision’s meaning.
Interpreters who use this method to define the Establishment Clause often rely on
the writing and history of James Madison and of the First Congress. For the scholar, the
natural starting point is the purpose of the provision, or in this case, the purpose of the
Bill of Rights itself, a compromise made between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists
in order to secure the ratification of the Constitution. (Center for Civic Education 2000)
The Anti-Federalists had many concerns regarding the new government, and their most
significant concern was that the right of the states to rule within their own spheres was
going to be usurped by a newly empowered national government. (Ketcham 1986)
Among their greatest fears was the idea that the national government could infiinge on
the rights of the people, rights protected by the individual state constitutions.
James Madison, ideological leader of the Federalist movement, was initially
reluctant to include religious protections in the list of liberties that would be guaranteed
by the federal government. It was not that he expected the national government to allow
religious persecution, but he did not wish to list rights over which the federal government
had no initial power. At the Virginia Ratifying Convention, Madison is quoted as
remarking, “There is not a shadow of right in the general government to intermeddle with
religion. Its least interference with it would be a most flagrant usurpation.” Both
Madison and the Anti-Federalists agreed that religion was a matter that was strictly under

24

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

State control, but the Anti-Federalists insisted that the same protections for religion that
existed on a state level should be applied to the federal government.
Madison modeled the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment after similar
clauses in many state constitutions, including the clause in the Virginia constitution that
Madison encouraged Mason to include. (Center for Civic Education 2000) Maryland’s
official interpretation of non-establishment meant that all Christian churches were to have
equal access to state funding. (Maryland Constitution of 1776, Declaration of Rights)
The New Jersey Constitution of 1776 reads, “That there shall be no establishment of any
one sect in this Province, in preference to another,” but in the next sentence grants special
privileges to Protestant. From these, Madison developed a clause which simply read,
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.” (United States
Constitution) This wording is clearly broader and more tolerant of non-Christian sects
than the state constitutions were, but the basic meaning was the same: Congress was not
to support a religion.
Madison was a Deist and feared excessive intermingling of church and state. A
1774 letter to William Bradford detailed Madison’s fear of an overly powerful religious
sect taking over government functions as he detailed persecution of religious dissenters in
his own community. He wrote, “That diabolical Hell conceived principle of persecution
rages among some and to their eternal Infamy the Clergy can furnish their Quota of Imps
for such business. This vexes me the most of any thing whatever. There are at this in the
adjacent County not less than 5 or 6 well meaning men in close for publishing their
religious Sentiments which in the main are very orthodox.” (Madison 1774) Evidence
suggests that Madison’s view of the clause he penned may be more narrow than many
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have assumed. Madison is quoted in the Congressional record as stating that “he
apprehended the meaning of the words to be, that Congress should not establish a religion
and enforce the legal observation of it by law, nor compel men to worship in any manner
contrary to their own conscience.” (Annals I: 729-731) Further proof that Madison did
not intend to prohibit all forms of government support for religious practice comes from
Madison’s presidency. During the War of 1812, Madison declared a national day of
prayer and fasting. (Madison 1814)
The First Congress also left some key as to what the Establishment Clause meant.
In its debate over the clause, the wording was clarified so as to restrict only the federal
government and not to infiinge on the states’ right to adopt their own religious
protections. Many of the congressmen feared that the amendment would be too harmfiil
of religion and would restrict the relationship between religion and state too narrowly.
(Annals 1:729-731) That debate took place, as all others since the founding of Congress,
after a prayer led by a chaplain paid by federal funds. This Congress also approved both
a national day of prayer and thanksgiving and direct financial support to privately run
schools that were still in the practice of teaching religious principles. (Center for Civic
Education)
Thomas Jefferson’s role as Secretary of State did not give him much of a voice in
the process of proposing or ratifying the amendment, but Jefferson is often quoted in
Court decisions restricting governments involvement with religion. The most quoted
phrase, “Wall of Separation” comes from a letter he wrote to a Baptist committee in
1801. Jefferson wrote:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man
and his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his
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worship, that the legislative powers of government reach actions only, and
not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole
American people which declared that their legislature should "make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof," thus building a wall of separation between church and
State. Adhering to this expression of the supreme will of the nation in
behalf of the rights of conscience, I shall see with sincere satisfaction the
progress of those sentiments which tend to restore to man all his natural
rights, convinced he has no natural right in opposition to his social duties.
In this context, he seems to be referring to the fact that government cannot infringe on a
citizen’s right to believe as he chooses. Jefferson acknowledges the importance of the
moral values that religion carries with it in regards to the education of youth. In his
second inaugural address, he was clear as to where power over religion lay.
In matters of religion, I have considered that its free exercise is placed by
the constitution independent of the powers of the general government. I
have therefore undertaken, on no occasion, to prescribe the religious
exercises suited to it; but have left them, as the constitution found them,
under the direction and discipline of state or church authorities
acknowledged by the several religious societies. (1805)
Evidence as to the intent of the Framers with regard to the meaning of the
Establishment Clause would lead one to the conclusion that religious matters were to be
left mainly to the state. This is complicated by the Fourteenth Amendment and the
incorporation doctrine spawned by the Court in the early twentieth century.
Interpretation of the Establishment Clause in light of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment revokes this power from the state governments. {Everson v.
Board o f Education 330 U.S. 1) However, several justices have argued that a more
historical interpretation of the First Amendment allows the states the right to
ceremonially use prayer in school facilities. Footnotes 1,2, and 3 of Justice Stewart’s
dissent in Engel v. Vitale (370 U.S. 421) detail the many instances in which the federal
government has ceremonially made reference to God in official public speeches or
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activities. Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent in Wallace v. Jqffree (472 U.S. 38),
called modem interpretation of the Establishment Clause a misreading of the history.
This record would seem to indicate that the intent of the Framers was not to restrict state
sponsored schools from offering an opening prayer which was neither coercive nor
denominational.
One cannot necessarily rely, however, on the intent of the Framers as sound
constitutional interpretation. The Congress that framed the Fourteenth Amendment also
passed an ordinance forcing Washington, D.C.’s public schools to be racially segregated.
{Brown v. Board o f Education 347 U.S. 483 1954) Few would argue today, however,
that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause allows the segregation of
public schools in the United States. Those who believe that the Constitution should adapt
to changing times and mores cite Brown and other civil rights cases as examples of the
Constitution not only adapting, but fulfilling the promise of its provisions.

Literal Interpretation
Scholars of literal interpretation seek to divine the meaning of a constitutional
provision by interpreting word usage and placement. Proponents of this method claim
that it will maintain the integrity of the Constitution as a guiding document as it allows
for a consistent and clear reading of constitutional provisions. Opponents claim that
changing nuisances in word usage confound the method and that experts will continue to
disagree over the importance of word placement and word choice. This method allows
little adaptation of the Constitution to modem problems and relies on the same limited
historical record on which the intent of the Framers rests. (Scalia 1998)
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As far as interpretation of the Establishment Clause is concerned, one would have
to look at the very specific usage of the words. First of all, Congress is specified as the
institution which may not make a law respecting an establishment of religion. This
would restrict the usage of the clause to the federal government only, but this
interpretation would have to be modified in order to account for the effects of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the incorporation doctrine. {Everson v. board o f Education
330 U.S. 1)
Secondly, one would have to study the wording. It seems as if all sides agree that
the Establishment Clause restricts the federal government fium setting up a mandated
state church the way the English king had established the Church of England. There is,
however, debate over the definition of the word “establishment.” In the Framers’ time,
establishment may have meant simply that a government was setting up an official
religious practice, but the Court has defiued Establishment by three criteria: non-secular
purpose, advancing or inhibiting religion, and the excessive entanglement of government
with religion. {Lemon v. Kurtzman 401 U.S. 192) This definition has caused a great deal
of confusion over the definition of a secular purpose. (Van Alstyne 1963) Most of the
debate has been limited to cases involving state fimding of parochial schools; however,
the Lemon test has become the standard measure by which all school prayer cases are
measured as well. Incidentally, it is the secular purpose test on which school prayer
activities fail the test.
There is also confusion as to the definition of religion. Writing in 1951, Lynford
Lardner asserts that
If we assume that the Framers of the First Amendment used words
carefidly, it is easy to see that the Amendment might well mean more than
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just a prohibition of a national church in the British sense. A law
respecting an establishment of religion has more comprehensive
connotations than a law respecting the establishment of a church.
In 1963, William Carroll suggested that the only definition of the word religion would
have to be one which acknowledges the rights of non-believers with the same respect as
those of believers. These varying definitions of even the word religion can cause
problems as school and districts, feeling pressed by their constituencies, seek to find a
form of prayer that does not further religion.
The literal interpretation of the Establishment Clause, in its narrowest sense,
would seem to support state sponsored prayer in school, although it might prohibit
nationally sponsored prayer in school. Of course the Fourteenth Amendment and
Everson have, at least, complicated that part of the literal interpreter’s argument. There is
too much difficulty in this form of interpretation to say with any certainty the extent to
which the clause is applicable to the states as well as the extent to which it protects any
religious activity fi'om state intermingling. Different people involved in the
congressional debates may even have had different definitions of the words in question.
Also, placing special emphasis on specific words, such as “respecting” or “an”, can
change the literal meaning of clause. Some interpreters even grant special significance to
the absence of the word “a” before the word religion. (Levy 1986) Therefore, a justice
with a sharp mind could use a literal interpretation either to strike down or to defend
school prayer.
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Evolutionary Interpretation
The most common modem method of interpretation is the evolutionary method.
This allows a justice to broadly apply constitutional principles and concepts to the
changing needs of a changing society. It allows the constitution to bend and mold itself
to modem times without the lengthy and arduous process of constitutional amendment
and permits justices to apply their own morality and sense of faimess to constitutional
doctrine. Many scholars label this method “judicial activism,” which is a derogatory
term in the legal realm, and some complain of the lack of consistent precedent that is
spawned by the evolutionary approach. As difficult as it may be to scour the historical
record to discover the meanings of the past, it is more difficult to peer into a proverbial
crystal ball to discover the needs of the future. (Scalia 1998)
Justices usually try to confine themselves within accepted traditional principles of
constitutional government when interpreting the Constitution in this way. One of the key
concepts in relation to prayer in school is that of popular sovereignty, or mle by the will
of the people. Public opinion concerning school prayer has shown a consistent and
overwhelming majority in favor of non-denominational prayer in public school. (Green
and Guth 1989; Jacoby 1990; Servin- Gonzalez and Torres-Reyna 1999) In recognition
of public opinion, the Republican Party maintains a platform plank calling for an
amendment to allow non-denominational non-coercive prayer in public school. (Janda
1999) The amicus briefs filed to support states in each of the prayer cases can be
accepted as examples of popular support of school prayer. {Engel v. Vitale 370 U.S. 421,
Wallace v. Jqffree 472 U.S. 38) Many states, such as Nevada, have passed silent
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contemplation statutes that avoid the ruling in Jqffree by not making any mention of
prayer.
Another of the main doctrines of the American political system is that of
federalism, each state maintains certain powers that are not under the control of the
federal government. The Tenth Amendment states that “The powers not delegated to the
United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the
states respectively or to the people.” (United States Constitution) Judging by the claims
of Madison at the Virginia Ratifying Convention that the federal government had no hint
of power over religion, one might conclude that these powers would be left to the states
and to the people. Education, since becoming a public instead of private function, has
always been a state function (Arends 1998), and states are allowed to set their own moral
standards in other cases. {Miller v. California 418 U.S. 915) Therefore, one might
conclude that community standards should be the guiding principle in the matter of
school prayer. (Peterson 1963)
The interpretation of die Fourteenth Amendment as apply the Establishment
Clause to the states {Everson v. Board o f Education 330 U.S. 1) complicated the
relationship between the state governments and the Establishment Clause. The
Fourteenth Amendment was constructed in order to protect the rights of people from the
abusive powers of state governments. In Everson, the Court identified the right to
protection against the establishment of religion to be one of the fundamental rights to be
protected under the umbrella of the Fourteenth. This decision precluded states from
setting their own standards in regard to the establishment of religion and forced states to
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adapt to the national definition of the Establishment Clause, as defined by the United
States Supreme Court.
The general purpose of the First Amendment in total seems to be to protect
freedom of expression of ideas and beliefs. The Court has recognized this as a concern in
the case of Westside Community Board o f Education v. Mergens (496 U.S. 226). In order
to achieve Mill’s ideal of the marketplace of ideas, freedom of expression must be
protected in all places and in regards to all different forms of expression. (Mill 1982)
Students’ rights to express themselves do not disintegrate when school is in session
(Tinker v. Des Moines School District 393 U.S.503), but students do face stricter
restrictions on speech protections than do adults in public places. (Bethel School District
Number 403 v. Fraser 478 U.S. 675) This protection of the freedom of expression might
support a non-coercive school prayer if it was deemed to be an expression of the
students’ beliefs and not of the state’s, but the Supreme Court has also denied that this
type of expression is protected when school equipment is used for the dissemination of
the religious message and the school is aware that the student might express a religious
sentiment. (Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe 530 U.S. 290)
Madison believed that the greatest protection against religious persecution would
come from the diversity of belief within a nation as large and populated as the United
States. (Virginia Ratifying Convention 1787) This largely agreed with his view of
factions as expressed in Federalist 10. The protection of diversity, the respect to minority
rights, and the tolerance of religious factions are all basic parts of the American
foundation of government. The Establishment Clause gives American citizens a freedom
from religion. The Constitution denies the right of the government to establish a
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religious test for any public office. (United States Constitution Article VI) According to
some, any law concerning religion in the Untied States should consider the rights of non
believers as equal with the rights of believers and allow non-believers to follow their own
conscience without coercion, subtle or otherwise. (Carroll 1963) These principles may
conflict witii the establishment of a state-written prayer, even if it is non-denominational.
Lastly, the Constitution was written to limit the scope of government. It is a
social contract by the definition of John Locke, meant to protect people from the
government. (Wooten 1983) Under this definition, the government exists to protect life,
liberty, and property; it has no right to direct citizens to the proper use of any of those
rights unless they are in conflict with the rights of another. Since the reformation,
religion has been widely viewed as a private matter between the worshipper and his or
her God. Protestants are directed to read and interpret biblical scriptures for themselves,
and many sects believe in a personal path to salvation. (Ellis, E. and Esler, A. 1999)
Under this interpretation, state sponsored school prayer would probably not be
constitutional.
This type of interpretation leads to muddled and confiising policy. It may lead a
judge to decide that it is up to each individual community to decide and define prayer
statutes for itself. It may lead him to encourage school districts to write a prayer that
recognizes all religious traditions, including atheism, equally, a nearly impossible task. A
judge may require that the people in a state strip religion from their moral codes and
teach tiiem from a secular perspective, another daunting task. Evolutionary interpretation
seems to be the type used in the case of Engel v. Vitale (370 U.S. 421) and on which, by
the doctrine of stare decisis, all subsequent prayer cases have rested.
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Conclusion
Establishment Clause interpretation is notoriously difficult and inconsistent.
Religious practices involving school have enjoyed the support of the state and the Court
as long as the state acted neutrally, not showing favor to any sect, and as long as the
people participating had the right to choose their level of participation in the activity.
This is true of state funded busing to private school (Everson v. Board o f Education 330
U.S. 1), release time for students studying religion during the school day (Zorach v.
Clauson 343 U.S. 306), Bible club meetings on school campus (Westside Community
Board o f Education v. Mergens 496 U.S. 226), public school teachers providing
assistance to student with special needs in parochial schools (Agostini v. Felton 521 U.S.
203), and direct public payments to parochial schools for the education of at-risk
students. (Zelman v. Simmons-Harris 536 U.S. 639) Somehow, however, the same logic
of neutrality and choice does not apply to non-denominational, non-coercive prayer
(Engel V. Vitale 370 U.S. 421), moments of silence for prayer (Wallace v. Jaffree 472
U.S. 38), or prayer at extra-curricular activities. (Santa Fe Independent School District v.
DOE 530 U.S. 290) In these cases, the Courts have asked that the state be decidedly anti
religion. With regard to prayer, the Supreme Court has allowed public sponsorship of
prayer as a means of ceremonial recognition of God. Footnotes in Engel v. Vitale
reference the congressional use of chaplains, the crier’s introduction of the Supreme
Court, presidential proclamations of days of prayer and fasting, the national motto “In
God We Trust” on all U.S. currency, and the addition of the words “under God” to the
Pledge of Allegiance. This ceremonial usage, however, does not protect ceremonial
prayer at the beginning of the school day (Engel v. Vitale 370 U.S. 421), ceremonial
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invocations and benedictions at public school graduation ceremonies (Lee v. Weisman
505 U.S 577), or ceremonial prayer to begin a football game. (Santa Fe Independent
School District v. DOE 530 U.S. 290)
In the United States, there has always been a tangled relationship between religion
and state, especially in regards to the education of children. There is a precarious balance
between the protection of people from religious indoctrination and persecution and
protecting the public morality. Religion has always been recognized as an important
piece of the foundation for democracy, from the writings of the classical republicans
(Plato The Republic Book III) to the observations of Tocqueville (Tocqueville
Democracv in America Volume 1 Part 2 Chapter 9) to the studies of modem political
scientists. (Reichley 1986) Prayer in school has been a major battlefield for the balancing
of rights of the individual and protection of the common good, and the war of lawsuits,
proposed amendments, and state insubordination continues. (Elifson and Hadaway 1985)
For the Court, the challenge is to create a definition of the Establishment Clause that is
consistent, that protects the free exercise of the religious people of the nation, that
protects the fi’eedom fi'om religion for non-believers, and that satisfies public opinion in
order to preserve democracy.
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CHAPTERS

ENGEL V. VITALE
"Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy
blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country." {Engel v. Vitale 370 U.S.
421) These simple words, spoken by school children in the State of New York at the
beginning of their school day in 1962 would set off one of the most controversial cases in
recent history. The regents in New York developed the prayer as part of a program that
would improve moral and spiritual training in the public schools. It was the purpose of
this prayer, not simply the wording, that caused some parents to immediately object to
what they perceived as the Christian indoctrination of their children and as a direct
violation of the First Amendment. {Engel v. Vitale 370 U.S. 421)
Although the New York Court of Appeals forced schools in New York to allow
students to remain silent or to leave the room witiiout any comment from the teacher, the
parents were unsatisfied. They appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States for
redress of their grievances uncovering, on a national level, the controversy that had been
brewing in many of the states. (Way 1985) Certainly, they argued, the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment should protect people of marginal religious faiths from
encroachment by the majority. When the Supreme Court agreed, school districts across
the nation scrambled to find some way around the decision and the public cried foul.
(Elifson and Hadaway 1985,Servin-Gonzalez and Torres Reyna 1999)
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The problem with the Engel decision may not have been one of proper reading of
the Constitution, though previously decided establishment precedent, if closely followed,
may have led to a different conclusion. {Everson v. Board o f Education o f Ewing
Township 330 U.S. 1, Zorach v. Clauson 343 U.S. 306) In his decision. Black attempted
to divorce the tradition of the United States from its state practices while using aspects of
American history to deride even cursory state support of religion and ignoring the
positive interplay between government and religion that has characterized the United
States. {Engel v. Vitale 370 U.S. 421) It might have been this divorcement of America
from its traditions in the case of schooling that lead to the greatest portion of the public
outcry.
Overall, the issue of whether of not prayer is permissible in public school did not
begin or end with the Engel decision. The divisiveness of the issue stretches back into
the early twentieth century; however, the split within the Court to some degree mirrored
the split within the nation, and the case nationalized the issue of public prayer. Justice
Black, while expanding the protections of the Establishment Clause, shed little light on
proper interpretation of the clause, which led to further cases as states and school districts
maneuvered around the decision.

Public Opinion and Federalism
One of the key principles of the Supreme Court is that it is designed to be
apolitical, free from the pressures of public opinion and from the forces that often control
other branches. It is not surprising, then, that the Court occasionally makes decisions that
are severely out of step with public passions. Such was the case with the Engel decision.
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Usually, over several years, the societal norms shift to align themselves with judicial
doctrine, as in the case of school desegregation. (Wilson 2002) This did not happen in
the Engel case, as public opinion in favor of non-denominational prayer in school has
only narrowly declined in the twenty years since the decision has been enforced. ( Elifson
and Hadaway 1985, Servin-Gonzalez and Torres-Reyna 1999)
The sheer weight of public opinion is evident in the number and types of amicus
curiae briefs filed in relation to the case. Twenty-two different states filed amid in
support of the right of the state of New York to continue these prayers. It is obvious that
these twenty-two states would be directly affected by the decisions, since they would
have to amend their moral education codes as well. Filing amicus against the prayer were
an ethical union and two Jewish Councils. {Engel v. Vitale 370 U.S. 421) The Jewish
population of the United States is admittedly smaller than the Christian population and
has always been part of a type of marginal religious group, but this case should not be
interpreted as a problem of Christians against Jews, since the Court acknowledged that
some respondents professed no particular religion.
According to Justice Black’s decision in Everson v. Board o f Education, states are
meant to be neutral in the treatment of religion. He writes, “That Amendment requires
the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non
believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary. State power is no more to be
used so as to handicap religions, than it is to favor them.” (330 U.S. 1) Modem analysis
has shown, however, that the Court has tended to favor marginal religious practices over
those of the majority population. This was not common prior to the decision in Engel,
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however, it was common after the judicial religious revolution of which Engel was the
beginning. Way and Burt wrote,
In our study of litigation from 1946 through 1956 when marginal religious
claimants sought exemptions from social norms that conflicted with their
religious beliefs and strict codes of behavior, the judiciary was generally
not receptive...the percentages of successfiil claims increased dramatically
during the period from 1970 to 1980. (1983)
Although this research deals most directly with the Free Exercise Clause, it is applicable
here for the fact that persons belonging to marginal faiths or professing no faith were
challenging an established traditional practice within the public school system, and the
Court ended up ruling in favor of these litigants. It is arguable also, that the free exercise
of the majority faith was curtailed by the decision to end school prayer, as those litigants
were no longer able to reap full enjoyment of their own religious practices, even after the
state made many clear attempts to remain neutral by composing a prayer that was nondenominational and by allowing exemptions for those whose parents did not wish them to
participate.
Again, this issue did not arise from nothingness beginning with the Engel case,
but prior to the decision in Everson, each state was left to make its own rules regarding
religious establishment according to its own constitution. Some states even struck the
practice prior to the Engel decision, but most states in which it was challenged agreed
that public school prayer did not constitute direct state support of religion. Way writes.
Prior to Engel/Schempp, sixteen states upheld prayer and Bible reading,
generally in single decisions which were never overturned or adjusted.
Similarly, five states ruled against prayers and/or Bible reading in single
decisions which, again, were never overturned or modified. Two
additional states, while upholding the constitutionality of prayer and Bible
reading, required that schools institute an excuse system for students who
did not wish to participate on the grounds of religious belief. (1985)
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Fully eighteen state courts, when challenged, upheld the right of states and school
districts to create prayers for use in the public schools as part of a moral or character
education based on the fact that history and tradition folly supported the practice. This
reinforces the importance, prior to Engel, of the history and traditional alignment of
prayer and public schooling.
Several factors contribute to the controversial nature of this case. First, the
decision was in direct opposition to prevailing public opinion on the issue. (Elifson and
Hadaway 1985, Servin-Gonzale and Torres-Reyna 1999) The fact that three of the seven
justices who sat on the case wrote separate opinions signals the degree of the depth of
disagreement in the United States over the issue of school prayer. Second, some
interpreted the decision as the Court to place the Establishment Clause to place the Free
Exercise rights of marginal religions above those of the majority. (Way and Burt 1983)
Third, it exempted public schools from enjoyment of a religious practice which is
acceptable in other public spheres. Last, and most importantly, it shifted accepted
interpretation of the Establishment Clause from that practiced by the states (Way 1985)
and from that made law by the Everson decision.

History
Justice Black began his decision in Engel with a long history of the establishment
of religion from colonial settlement until the passage of the First Amendment, a feat he
repeated from his decision in Everson. {Everson v. Board o f Education 330 U.S. 1, Engel
V.

Vitale 370 U.S. 421) Although he recognized the early interplay of religion and

community life, he dismissed the need for continuing religious interference in education.
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Black invoked the names of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison as proponents of a
strict separation of church and state, but he ignores the interplay of religion and public
goals even within the writings of these two Founders. Last, he used the history of
religious establishment to justify the interpretation of the Establishment Clause that
would allow him to remove even non-denominational, non-coercive prayer from schools,
but research into the passage and meaning of the clause implies another answer might be
possible.
The history of establishment in Europe is most definitely one of violent
persecution. Black used this backdrop to describe the excesses of religious establishment
that can start with something as simple as state support of a non-denominational prayer.
He wrote, “It is a matter of history that this very practice of establishing govemmentally
composed prayers for religious services was one of the reasons which caused many of our
early colonists to leave England and seek religious freedom in America.” Early colonial
experience, he described, was fraught with religious persecution of minority faiths,
prompting, at least by the late eighteenth century, but earlier in some colonies, the
passage of a string of religious toleration laws in the early states. James Madison and
Thomas Jefferson led the charge in Virginia, with Madison making significant effort to
tame the wording of the Virginia Bill of Rights.
What Black ignored when he invoked both Jefferson and Madison is the religious
nature of many of their writings. Neither, of course, was in favor of establishing specific
churches for any state in the Union nor of forcing support of any religion by tax monies.
However, Jefferson and Madison are far from irreligious, and there was not a strict
separation, for these two, between religious virtues and secular, democratic virtues. Both
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recognized the large role that religion played in the development of the American ideal
(Reichley 1986), although Madison especially feared the power of overbearing religious
majorities. (Lindsay 1991)
Thomas Jefferson, often wrongly believed to be the original source of the wall of
separation metaphor, often wrote with a religious overtone. The Declaration of
Independence of 1776 makes several references to a Creator. Jefferson, in a letter to Dr.
Thomas Cooper in 1822, relayed his recommendation that the University of Virginia
invite all sects to establish theology professorships for the training of young men. In
addition, he thought that the theological discussion that would take place in such close
quarters would lead to greater cooperation and peace between competing sects.
(Jefferson [1822] 1984) His disagreement was with education controlled by a specific
sect.
In Everson, Black focused on Jefferson’s authorship of the Act Establishing
Religious Freedom in Virginia in 1785. (330 U.S. 1) Black considered this bill to be the
furthest reaching of the early religious freedom bills and purported to support Jefferson’s
principles. {Engel v. Vitale 370 U.S. 421) However, Jefferson began this Bill with the
words “Almighty God.” The thrust of Black’s argument; however, seemed to rest on a
passage removing public financial support from any religious function.
that to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation
of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical; that even the
forcing him to support this or that teacher of his own religious persuasion,
is depriving him of the comfortable liberty of giving his contributions to
the particular pastor, whose morals he would make his pattern, and whose
powers he feels most persuasive to righteousness, and is withdrawing from
the ministry those temporary rewards, which proceeding from an
approbation of their personal conduct, are an additional incitement to
earnest and unremitting labours for the instruction of mankind; Virginia,
Act Establishing Religious Freedom 1785)
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In order for this argument to apply successfully in the case of Engel v. Vitale, one would
first have to equate the salary of the teacher who is leading the prayer with a financial
support of said prayer. As Justice William O. Douglas clarified in his concurrence.
In New York the teacher who leads in prayer is on the public payroll; and
the time she takes seems minuscule as compared with the salaries
appropriated by state legislatures and Congress for chaplains to conduct
prayers in the legislative halls. Only a bare fraction of the teacher's time is
given to reciting this short 22-word prayer, about the same amount of time
that our Crier spends announcing the opening of our sessions and offering
a prayer for this Court. {Engel v. Vitale 370 U.S. 430)
For Douglas, as for many Americans, it was difficult to see the prayer as an
unconstitutional financial support of religion. Douglas also stated that all semblance of
coercion had been removed from the practice, except the coercion of teachers, of which
no one was complaining. Therefore, Black’s argument that he is following Jefferson’s
principles does not seem to hold up to historical analysis, since there was no coercion.
James Madison was also rather prolific in his writing concerning religious values
and the role of the state, and more importantly, he is generally deemed the author of the
First Amendment. Madison, though considered hostile toward religion by some (Lindsay
1991), often spoke of a duty to a creator. Even while arguing against a bill that would
provide direct state aid to Christian teachers, Madison exhorted the importance of
religion in the lives of the American people. He even directly quoted a previous
statement attributed to himself by saying, “Because we hold it for a fundamental and
undeniable truth, ‘that Religion or the duty which we owe to our Creator and the manner
of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or
violence.’" (Madison 1785) Madison believed that no man should be coerced into
supporting any religious belief.
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Again, beginning with Douglas’ argument, one can see why Madison’s principle
is not necessarily in conflict with the Regents’ prayer in New York. Douglas wrote.
No student, however, is compelled to take part. The respondents have
adopted a regulation which provides that "Neither teachers nor any school
authority shall comment on participation or non-participation. . . nor
suggest or request that any posture or language be used or dress be worn
or be not used or not worn." Provision is also made for excusing children,
upon written request of a parent or guardian, from the saying of the prayer
or from the room in which the prayer is said. A letter implementing and
explaining this regulation has been sent to each taxpayer and parent in the
school district. As I read this regulation, a child is free to stand or not
stand, to recite or not recite, without fear of reprisal or even comment by
the teacher or any other school official. {Engel v. Vitale 370 U.S. 421)
So, under the exemption plan as devised by the New York State Court of Appeals, no
child was being coerced to support any religious beliefs. Second, both Black and
Douglas concede the non-denominational nature of the prayer, meaning that the Regent’s
prayer imparted no specific religious belief, according to the Court. The problem instead
seemed to be the format of the prayer, out of sync with Jewish tradition, and the fact that
it supported religion in general, which may have offended those who professed no
religion. Last, the spirit of the prayer was in the tradition of the ceremonial recognition of
God, a tradition to which Madison was not immune. In footnote 3 of his dissent. Justice
Stewart quoted Madison as saying, during the term of his presidency,
"But the source to which I look. . . is i n . . . my fellow-citizens, and in the
counsels of those representing them in the other departments associated in the
care of the national interests. In these my confidence vdll under every difficulty
be best placed, next to that which we have all been encouraged to feel in the
guardianship and guidance of that Almighty Being whose power regulates the
destiny of nations, whose blessings have been so conspicuously dispensed to this
rising Republic, and to whom we are bound to address our devout gratitude for
the past, as well as our fervent supplications and best hopes for the future." {Engel
V . Vitale 370 U.S. 421)
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Even Thomas Lindsay, who believed that Madison was hostile to religion concluded that
Madison would not support the dissolution of a law based on that law’s support of
general religious morality over the rights of marginal religions to freely exercise. (1991)
Black attempted to use this historical argument to provide a sound basis for his
view of the purpose of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment made applicable
to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. He wrote
The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not
depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is
violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion
whether those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or
not. This is not to say, of course, that laws officially prescribing a
particular form of religious worship do not involve coercion of such
individuals. When the power, prestige and financial support of
government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect
coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing
officially approved religion is plain. But the purposes underlying the
Establishment Clause go much fiirther than that. Its first and most
immediate purpose rested on the belief that a union of government and
religion tends to destroy government and to degrade religion. (Engel v.
Vitale 370 U.S. 421)
In this way he made an argument that is broader in its stroke than either Jefferson’s or
Madison’s. Black did not reference, however, the historical data that would argue that
the purpose of the Establishment Clause is much more narrow than he would assume.
The First Congress authorized many outlays of public monies to assist schools, at a time
when most schooling was done in religious institutions. They also authorized a chaplain
who would lead daily prayer in the chambers of Congress. Although Black recognized
the chaplaincy in Congress as an acceptable form of public prayer, which is not only
often denominational in nature and somewhat coercive on the members of Congress, he
separated this historical authorization of public support of prayer from the authorization
of prayer in public schools. (Engel v. Vitale 370 U.S. 421)
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Justice Black’s reliance on the historical record to prove the dangers of
establishment are very convincing to the extent that they concern direct establishment of
specific religious beliefs by the federal government, but they are less convincing to
accomodationists in the case of a non-denominational, non-coercive school prayer
established by a state government. The state of New York made no attempt to establish a
particular religious belief and to coerce young students into blindly accepting such, the
way a European nation of the Middle Ages might have done. Jefferson and Madison,
who were vehemently opposed to this type of establishment as well as other direct state
support of specific religious principles, both seem to recognize the importance of
traditional morality and virtue in the schooling process. Furthermore, Black’s
interpretation of the Establishment Clause seems to be more sweeping than even his
previous interpretation in Everson. In his concurrence, Douglas conceded the historical
argument to the acomodationists, saying, “I cannot say that to authorize this prayer is to
establish a religion in the strictly historic meaning of those words. A religion is not
established in the usual sense merely by letting those who choose to do so say the prayer
that the public school teacher leads.” {Engel v. Vitale 370 U.S. 421)

Tradition
The most prevalent argument in the concurrence and dissent of Engel is that of
tradition. Black grazed by this argument, relegating it to a foomote, but the sheer weight
of public outcry may be based in large part on the long-standing tradition in the United
States of marking important activities with an invocation of God. In fact, more recent
cases involving school prayer have centered themselves around this traditional aspect in
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asking the Court to consider prayer at graduation {Lee v. Weisman 505 U.S. 577) and
even student led prayer to begin a football game. (Santa Fe Independent School District
V. Doe 530 U.S. 290)
There are in fact two parts to the argument that traditional features of American
government would support a non-denominational prayer at the beginning of the school
day. First, there is a traditional link between secular and religious education that began
with the first schools in the United States. Second is the fact that public prayer is
recognized as proper in many different publicly supported forums besides that of school.
Justice Stewart’s dissent in Engel rested almost entirely on the second feature. (370 U.S.
421)
The first institutions of learning in the United States arose in order to train clergy
and were later expanded to training in other fields of academia without losing their
fundamentally religious flair or church fimding. Justice Douglas noted in footnote 9 that
Religion was once deemed to be a function of the public school system.
The Northwest Ordinance, which antedated the First Amendment,
provided in Article III that "Religion, morality, and knowledge being
necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and
the means of education shall forever be encouraged.” (Engel v. Vitale 370
U.S. 421)
Douglas, does not concede, however, that this is a valid reason to continue the
entanglement of government and religion in the area of education. The justices made no
attempt to explain why 1962 was the appropriate year to cut the vine of religion fi"om the
tree of learning. One must assume that no one had ever challenged a similar practice at
the Supreme Court level prior to that year.
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School is the place in which students leam to become part of the American
society, not only through rote and tests, but also through the practice of American values
and ceremonial rituals. Justice Black claimed
There is of course nothing in the decision reached here that is inconsistent
with the fact that school children and others are officially encouraged to
express love for our country by reciting historical documents such as the
Declaration of Independence which contain references to the Deity or by
singing officially espoused anthems which include the composer's
professions of faith in a Supreme Being, or with the fact that there are
many manifestations in our public life of belief in God. Such patriotic or
ceremonial occasions bear no true resemblance to the unquestioned
religious exercise that the State of New York has sponsored in this
instance. {Engel v. Vitale 370 U.S. 421)
As difficult as it is for the common reader to understand the difference between the nondenominational prayer and the reference to God in more patriotic pieces, it has also
become increasingly difficult to separate these two in the long wake of the Engel
decision. In 2002, a father in the state of California claimed Establishment Clause
violation by the Congress when it added the words “imder God” to the Pledge of
Allegiance in 1953 as a means to enhance patriotism during the Cold War. To much
public dismay, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with the
parent, using the Lee decision as a guide. (Newdow v. United States Congress 00-16423)
The United States Supreme Court stayed the lower court decision and eventually
overturned the decision based on a standing issue. {Elk Grove Independent School
District v. Newdow 000 U.S. 12-1624) The three minority opinions issued in Newdow
dealt with the merits, however. One, Justice Clarence Thomas’, traced the evolution of
Establishment Clause interpretation directly through the decision by the Ninth Circuit,
claiming that the Ninth Circuit made their decision fully aligned with a flawed precedent
that dated back to Everson.
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Considering that there is a direct connection between the decision in Lee and the
precedent o î Engel it seems as if Black’s fear of a slippery slope of establishment, that
allowing the state to write a non-denominational prayer would lead to further state
encroachments of religion, has worked in the opposite direction since the publication of
the Engel decision. As Court of Appeals Judge O’Scanlain pointed out in dissent to the
denial of an order presented in Newdow, “Such an assertion would make hypocrites out
of the founders and would have the effect of driving any and all references to our
religious heritage out of our schools, and eventually out of our public life.” {Newdow v.
United States Congress 00-16423)
American public life is intertwined with religious practice and tradition. Justice
Douglas detailed a list of just some of the pervasive aspects of religion in public life in
foomote 1 of his concurrence. Quoting David Fellman, he stated,
"There are many aids' to religion in this country at all levels of
government. To mention but a few at the federal level, one might begin by
observing that the very First Congress which wrote the First Amendment
provided for chaplains in both Houses and in the armed services. There is
compulsory chapel at the service academies, and religious services are
held in federal hospitals and prisons. The President issues religious
proclamations. The Bible is used for the administration of oaths. N. Y. A.
and W. P. A. funds were available to parochial schools during the
depression. Veterans receiving money under the G. I.' Bill of 1944 could
attend denominational schools, to which payments were made directly by
the government. During World War II, federal money was contributed to
denominational schools for the training of nurses. The benefits of the
National School Lunch Act are available to students in private as well as
public schools. The Hospital Survey and Construction Act of 1946
specifically made money available to non-public hospitals. The slogan 'In
God We Trust' is used by the Treasury Department, and Congress recently
added God to the pledge of allegiance. There is Bible-reading in the
schools of the District of Columbia, and religious instruction is given in
the District's National Training School for Boys. Religious organizations
are exempt from the federal income tax and are granted postal privileges.
Up to defined limits -15 per cent of the adjusted gross income of
individuals and 5 per cent of the net income of corporations - contributions
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to religious organizations are deductible for federal income tax purposes.
There are no limits to the deductibility of gifts and bequests to religious
institutions made under the federal gift and estate tax laws. This list of
federal 'aids' could easily be expanded, and of course there is a long list in
each state." Fellman, The Limits of Freedom (1959), pp. 40-41. {Engel
Vitale 370 U.S. 421)
Many of the rest of Douglas’ footnotes give further insight to the many government
activities entrenched in religious ceremony; however, he and Justice Black saw a
significant difference in the case of schooling. There was no indoctrination, they argued,
but the problem seemed to lie in the non-neutral nature of the law under which the prayer
was written, since that law was aimed at the moral and spiritual training of young
citizens. {Engel v. Vitale 370 U.S. 421)
Justice Stewmf went further with the tradition argument, detailing the many
instances of presidential reference to God in public speeches as well as usage of God on
money and in the motto of the United States. Stewart claimed, “1 think that to deny the
wish of these school children to join in reciting this prayer is to deny them the
opportunity of sharing in the spiritual heritage of our Nation.” {Engel v. Vitale 370 U.S.
421) Adults in the United States are subject to many unsolicited calls for prayer or
recognition of God in the public sector. If school is to create Americans citizens prepared
to join in the civic life of the nation, a non-denominational prayer seems fully aligned
with the ceremonial usages of religion these citizens-in-training will confront as adults.
Judge O’Scanlain made a powerful argument about the removal of religion from
all aspects of public life. {Newdow v. U.S. Congress 00-16423) To erase God entirely
from the classroom would deny students the rich tradition of the United States, which can
be found in the Declaration of Independence and in patriotic anthems and poems. It is
possible that there are several interpretations of the idea implied in the word “God.” It is
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true that many different religions, from monotheistic to polytheistic forms, have differing
interpretations of this concept. In the United States, there exists a secular concept of God
as a force that has guided the country through peril and through success. It is this concept
that is recognized in the traditional ceremonial uses of the word.
To remove God from education is to disentangle rope that has been knotted for
too long. Original schemes of education in the United States depended on religion, and
religion depended on education. Long-standing traditions encourage Americans to
recognize a deity or a creator in many different ceremonial forms. These things are
ingrained into the American culture, and as Kymlicka writes, “It is possible for a state not
to have an established church. But the state cannot help but give at least partial
establishment to a culture.” (1997)

Differentiation from Previous Establishment Clause Cases
Possibly the most alarming thing about the decision in Engel was its departure
from precedent in the area of state support to religion. Engel made a distinction between
prayer in public school and other forms of public support of religion in school. The two
most pertinent precedents are Everson v. Board o f Education ofEwing Township and
Zorach v. Clauson. In each instance the state was allowed to provide some support to
students seeking religious education within the school day, either by providing bus
transportation to parochial schools {Everson 330 U.S. I) or by allowing students to travel
off campus in order to attend religious instruction. {Zorach 343 U.S. 306) Although
Black distinguished the situation in Engel based on the non-neutrality of the legislation.
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Black admited the similarities and simply stated that Everson’s conclusion was incorrect.
{Engel V . Vitale 330 U.S. 421)
It was in Everson that the Court first applied the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
bringing the issue of school prayer clearly under the jurisdiction of the federal
government. It was also here that Justice Black reinvigorated the metaphor of a wall of
separation between church and state that separates the actions of each to protect each one
from the other. He wrote.
The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at
least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer
one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to
or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a
belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church
attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be
levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may
be called, or whatever from they may adopt to teach or practice religion.
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly,
participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice
versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of
religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between Church
and State.' {Everson v. Board o f Education 330 U.S. 1)
After this impassioned plea for the strict separation of church and state. Black decided
that states may provide bus transportation for children to parochial schools, because it is
akin to the many other protections that a government must provide to parochial schools
and public schools without discriminating between the two, such as fire and police
protections. Therefore, the decision in Everson allowed direct state support of religious
functions so long as that support did not favor any specific religion or religion over
irréligion. (330 U.S. 1)
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It seems as if other justices on the Court were confused by this distinction as well.
The vote of the Court was a close 5-4, and two of the dissenting justices felt compelled to
attach dissents calling for a more complete separation of church and state. Justice
Jackson wrote.
The Court's opinion marshals every argument in favor of state aid and puts
the case in its most favorable light, but much of its reasoning confirms my
conclusions that there are no good grounds upon which to support the
present legislation. In fact, the undertones of the opinion, advocating
complete and uncompromising separation of Church from State, seem
utterly discordant with its conclusion yielding support to their
commingling in educational matters. (Everson v. Board o f Education 330
U.S. 1)
It is ironic that if the dissenters had prevailed in Everson rather than Black’s own
decision becoming precedent in that case. Black’s decision in Engel would be better
aligned with established precedent.
Zorach offers a similar situation and conclusion as does Everson. It is notable
that Zorach is an almost complete reversal of a previous case in which the Court struck
down release-time schemes in schools that allowed religious instructors to use school
facilities during school hours. (McCollum v. Board o f Education 333 U.S. 306) The
minor adjustment that allowed the Court to reverse itself, an action it rarely takes, was the
movement of the religious instructors off school grounds. Under this scheme, children
were allowed to be released from school during the day to report to religious instructors
off campus and any absence was reported to the public school teacher. In the absence of
explicit public funding or use of public facilities, the Court ruled that release-time was
not in violation of the Establishment Clause. (Zorach v. Clauson 343 U.S. 306)
Justice Douglas sums up the arguments against the release time program as
follows:
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Their argument, stated elaborately in various ways, reduces itself to this:
the weight and influence of the school is put behind a program for
religious instruction; public school teachers police it, keeping tab on
students who are released; the classroom activities come to a halt while the
students who are released for religious instruction are on leave; the school
is a crutch on which the churches are leaning for support in their religious
training; without the cooperation of the schools this "released time"
program, like the one in the McCollum case, would be futile and
ineffective. The New York Court of Appeals sustained the law against this
claim of unconstitutionality (Zorach v. Clauson 343 U.S. 306)
These claims seem similar to some of the arguments involved in the Engel case in which
Douglas comes to the exact opposite conclusion. In Engel, anti-prayer forces argued that
the fact that the weight and influence of the state was put behind the prayer, that public
school teachers were involved in reading the prayer, and that there was an underlying
coercion involved in state prayer that could not be factored out by allowing students to
remain silent or to leave the room made the development of the prayer an
unconstitutional act. (Engel v. Vitale 370 U.S. 421) The notable difference seems to be
that in the case of release-time, students choose the maimer of religious observance or
non-observance by choosing the religious program that each wished to attend, while in
the case of prayer, the manner of observance or non-observance was dictated by the state.
No justice in Engel drew this distinction.
Zorach, like Everson, was a closely decided case, with a high proportion of
separate dissents. Black’s position on state support of religion began to look more like
the strict separationist position he took in Engel. He wrote
Here the sole question is whether New York can use its compulsory
education laws to help religious sects get attendants presumably too
unenthusiastic to go unless moved to do so by the pressure of this state
machinery. That this is the plan, purpose, design and consequence of the
New York program caimot be denied. The state thus makes religious sects
beneficiaries of its power to compel children to attend secular schools.
Any use of such coercive power by the state to help or hinder some
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religious sects or to prefer all religious sects over nonbelievers or vice
versa is just what I think the First Amendment forbids. In considering
whether a state has entered this forbidden field the question is not whether
it has entered too far but whether it has entered at all. New York is
manipulating its compulsory education laws to help religious sects get
pupils. This is not separation but combination of Church and State.
{Zorach v. Clauson 343 U.S. 306)
In this case Black actually derided the argument of spiritual heritage and attached himself
whole-heartedly to the doctrine of separation.
The precedent, though highly disputed within the Court, was clear through the
published decisions in Everson and Zorach. Public support of religious institutions, even
moderate financial support, was allowable under the Constitution as long at that support
was neutral. New York made every attempt to make the Regents’ prayer neutral and noncoercive while remaining in keeping with traditional ceremonial usage of religion. The
Court, however, separated this form of state support of religion form all other forms,
deciding that the state could not in any way have play a direct role in composing a prayer
for public schools. {Engel v. Vitale 370 U.S. 421) This change in Establishment Clause
interpretation created the turbid stream of Establishment Clause cases that have found
their way to the Court most recently.

Conclusion
The application of the Establishment Clause to the states has been inconsistent,
especially with regard to state support of religion in school settings. This inconsistency
springs largely from the decision in Engel v. Vitale, which distinguished state
sponsorship of prayer from all other forms of state sponsorship of religion in schools. In
one decision, the Court shifted the historical interpretation of the purpose of the
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Establishment Clause, ended a time-honored traditional link between education and
religion, and confused accepted interpretation of the Establishment Clause. Public
opinion against the outcome of this case has little waned, and the Court has been forced
to decide even more recent school prayer cases as schools, districts, and states maneuver
through the tangled precedent of Establishment Clause interpretation.
If the Court considers state financial support of religious schooling to be
consistent with the Establishment Clause, then it should uphold school prayer. If the
Court finds prayer abhorrent to the First Amendment, then it should strike down release
time legislation as well. However, the Court should carefully examine its view of the
foundations of American democracy and the traditional ties between education and
religion, interpreting the words of the First Amendment in the light of the experience of
the nation.
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CHAPTER 4

LEE V. WEISMAN
The nearly three decade interval between the Engel (370 U.S. 421) case and that
of Lee V. Weisman (505 U.S. 577) found the Court seeking to clarify and codify
Establishment Clause interpretation, but to little avail. Chief Justice Warren Burger,
writing in Lemon v. Kurtzman (403 U.S. 602), sought to present a guide for future
interpretation of the Establishment Clause by creating a three-part test for discerning an
acceptable level of government interaction with religion. However, by the early nineties,
the Court seemed to have developed three different Establishment Clauses, dependent on
the situation. In cases concerning religious displays on public property, the Court seemed
to gradgingly accept the traditional and historical significance of symbolic religious
displays as long as there was no overtly denominational message. {Lynch v. Donnelly 465
U.S. 668, Allegheny v. ACLU 492 U.S. 573) Cases of school sponsored worship in the
forms of devotional readings or even moments of silence maintained a strict
interpretation of the Establishment Clause. {Abbington v. Schempp 374 U.S. 203,
Wallace v, Jaffree 472 U.S. 38) Somewhere in the middle of these conflicting
interpretations lay the funding cases, which remained mired in constitutional
misunderstanding and vague constructions, leading to frequently contradictory rulings
and even the overturning of some cases. {Aguilar v. Felton 473 U.S. 402, Agostini v.
Felton 521 U.S. 203)
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The Court has established that the school environment is one that distinct from the
world of American adults. Teachers and administrators are not held to strict standards of
search and seizure protections in the school environment {New Jersey v. TLO 469 U.S.
325); student rights to freedom of speech and press are more limited than they would be
outside of school {Bethel v. Fraser 478 U.S. 675, Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier 484 U.S. 260). Still, the very recognition of these expression rights, first in
1943 {West Virginia State Board o f Education v. Barnette 319 U.S. 624) then in the
Tinker case of 1969 (393 U.S. 503), in addition to the more recent recognition of free
exercise rights in Westside Community Board o f Education v. Mergens (496 U.S. 226),
set the First Amendment at odds with itself in the lives of the nation’s students. Lee v.
Weisman (505 U.S. 577) sought to draw a distinction between private speech and
exercise, which was protected by the First Amendment, and public speech which was
limited by the Establishment Clause.
Also at play in the case was the continual pull between American traditions and
modem constitutional interpretation. The controversy in Lee sprang from a practice that
was widely accepted and traditionally acknowledged. The decision itself, barring schools
from allowing invocations and benedictions at public school graduations (505 U.S. 577),
touched off a new controversy that has led to further cases. Clark County School District
in Nevada, in response to an ACLU-led attack, has changed its policy in order to allow
prayer at graduation by students, but only if school officials relinquish the right to prior
review of student speeches. (Bach 2003) A case recently decided by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized the right of a public official to pray at a public
event if the prayer is part of a private statement. {Doe v. School District o f the City o f
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NorfolklSo. 02-4135) This is a distinct representation of the inherent difficulty in
protecting the right of private individuals to speak and to freely exercise religion while
maintaining Establishment protections for those who choose not to participate in those
private exercises. The precedent established in Lee has only served to further this
conflict and has directly resulted in an attack on the Pledge of Allegiance. (Elk Grove
Independent School District v. Newdow 000 U.S. 1624)

Background of Lee v. Weisman
When Lee, a principal of a Rhode Island middle school, invited a rabbi to speak at
an upcoming graduation, he did not know that he was inviting a lawsuit that would
become an important piece of Establishment Clause litigation. He had invited clergy
before, always careful to provide his guests with a pamphlet that had been prepared by
religious organizations in order to guide them in offering non-denominational prayer at
public gatherings. Deborah Weisman and her father, however, took offense to this
traditionally accepted practice and filed suit, claiming that the invocation and benediction
to be offered at the graduation constituted an establishment of religion by the state of
Rhode Island. (Lee v. Weisman 505 U.S. 577) As the Court had previously decided, the
non-denominational nature of the prayers and the non-coercive nature of the graduation
ceremony would not appear to exempt this religious act from constitutional restrictions.
(Engel V. Vitale 370 U.S. 421)
In the previous two decades, the Court had made attempts to further clarify
Establishment Clause interpretation, first by issuing a three-pronged test by which
statutes in question could be measured and secondly by defining further the limits on

60

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

prayer in school. The Weismans’ arguments relied on these cases, the first restricting
government payment to parochial schools (Lemon v. Kurtzman 403 U.S. 602) and the
second striking down a mandated moment of silence for meditation and prayer in a public
school (Wallace v. Jaffree 472 U.S. 38). The school, however, relied on a decision, not
even a decade old, allowing ceremonial use of prayer in public functions. (Marsh v.
Chambers 463 U.S. 783) The case would pit modem, broad interpretations of the
Establishment Clause against the force of tradition.

The Lemon Test
One of the most significant changes to Court interpretation of the Establishment
Clause occurred between Engel and Lee. In 1971, the Court, seeking to streamline
Establishment Clause interpretation, issued a decision that is often recognized as one of
the most important precedents in Establishment Clause history. The case of Lemon v.
Kurtzman (401 U.S. 192) created a three-pronged test for deciding whether or not the
wall of separation between church and state has been breached. In order to pass
constitutional muster, any statute which supports religion in any way must have a secular
purpose. Secondly, the statute may not advance or inhibit religious practice. Lastly, the
statute must not foster excessive entanglement between church and state. It is by this test
that even the most recent Establishment Clause issues have been measured, but the Court
seems to have made only cursory mention of this important precedent in Lee. (505 U.S.
577)
One reason the Court may have chosen to comment little on this precedent might
be its overall failure to create a clear and consistent means of Establishment Clause
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interpretation. As an institution, the Court is dependent upon decisions of the past to
guide its current actions; this is called stare decisis. It is relatively rare for the Court to
reverse itself, but it seems as if the area of religious establishment is one in which
reversal is more common than in other areas of constitutional law. This may be related to
the fact that there are conflicts between protection from religion through the
Establishment Clause and protection of religion by the Free Exercise Clause of the
Constitution. Most importantly, however, school provides a fertile ground for
establishment conflicts as the dual private and public education systems in the United
States interact.
Even after clarification of the Establishment Clause by Lemon, the Court found
itself in waters mired by contradictions. Its assertion that church and state must be
strictly separated had come into conflict with national legislation meant to provide for the
free and equal education of students with special needs. In 1984, parents in New York
City brought suit against the school district, since the district was paying public school
teachers to spend time with special needs students who were attending parochial school.
According to the district, this was the most efficient way for the state to comply with the
federal law that forced the state to provide special services to eligible children, even if the
parents of those children chose to send the children to private parochial schools. Though
there was no preference for religious schools over non-religious private schools, the
Court ruled that this practice was in direct violation of the interpretation of the
Establishment Clause as defined in Lemon v. Kurtzman. {Aguilar v. Felton 473 U.S. 402
1985) Lemon, in fact, was based on a similar situation in which a state was providing
funding to private schools in order to improve secular education in those schools. The

62

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

State money was not to be used to provide any sort of religious education and was
distributed to all private religious and non-religious schools. (Lemon v. Kurtzman 401
U.S. 192)
Twelve years after the decision in Aguilar, the ability of the state to serve special
needs children had been so circumscribed by the ruling as to draw further suit. In
reversing the previous decision, the decision read
In Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402.413 . this Court held that New York
City's program that sent public school teachers into parochial schools to
provide remedial education to disadvantaged children pursuant to Title I of
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 necessitated an
excessive entanglement of church and state and violated the First
Amendment's Establishment Clause. On remand, the District Court
entered a permanent injunction reflecting that ruling. Some 10 years later,
petitioners—the parties bound by the injunction—filed motions in the same
court seeking relief jfi'om the injunction's operation under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b)(5). They emphasized the significant costs of
complying with Aguilar and the assertions of five Justices in Board of Ed.
of Kiryas Joel Village School Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687. that Aguilar
should be reconsidered, and argued that relief was proper under Rule
60(b)(5) and Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367.388 .
because Aguilar cannot be squared with this Court's intervening
Establishment Clause jurisprudence and is no longer good law. The
District Court denied tiie motion on the merits, declaring that Aguilar's
demise has "not yet occurred." The Second Circuit agreed and affirmed.
(Agostini v. Felton 521 U.S. 203 1997)
In ruling that Aguilar was now bad law, the Court was admitting to the many
complexities of Establishment Clause interpretation in a modem world. Though decided
several years after Lee, it is indicative of the confusion in the Court regarding
interpretation of the First Amendment’s religion clauses.
The Supreme Court had also obviously spent many years chipping away at the
edifice of Lemon. Further complicating this relationship between church and state, a law
was passed by the United States Congress, allowing religious groups equal access to
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public facilities. Again schools became the battle ground as a group of students in 1990
asked the Court to approve the creation of a Bible Club on the campus of their high
school. Now having to consider three separate clauses of the First Amendment
concerning freedom of speech and freedom of religion, the Court found itself approving
the club, allowing students to speak freely about religious subjects under the constant
supervision of a state employee on state property. {Westside Community Board o f
Education v. Mergens 496 U.S. 226 1990) Therefore, by the time Lee landed on the
Court’s docket, the seemingly clear and defined concept of establishment under the
Lemon precedent seemed much less clear and much less defined. To this day, the Lemon
test remains under judicial scrutiny, as the Court seeks to broaden the definition of
Establishment as it applies to fimding, even allowing states to provide tax money to
religious schools through parent choice and the use of vouchers. (Zelman v. SimmonsHarris 536 U.S. 639 2002)
Still, it is clear that fimding and prayer are fimdamentally different issues, since
state support in the latter case seems more obvious than in the former. Obviously
providing state fimding to operate a fire station that saves a parochial school from
burning to the ground does not constitute state establishment of religion, just as busing
students to the school of their choice does not violate this precious principle. {Everson v.
Board o f Education 330 U.S. 1 1947) However, the Court has established precedent in
regards to state sponsored prayer on school grounds. In Engel, the Court ruled that the
non-denominational, non-coercive prayer violated the Establishment Clause by favoring
religion over irréligion. The lower courts still tried to rely in part on Lemon, however, as
the accepted Establishment Clause interpretation. In doing so, the District Court and the
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United States Court of Appeals disagreed on the application of Lemon to the case. The
District Court ruled that the prayer at graduation violated only the second prong of
Lemon’s three-pronged test, that concerning the rule that the state can neither support nor
inhibit the practice of religion. According to the District Court, the prayer was a direct
support of religious practice. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals concluded that the
actions of the rabbi had violated all three parts of the Lemon test. With such unclear
precedent, it may be easy to understand why interpretation of Establishment Clause
issues remain a consistent topic of legal debate. (Lee v. Weisman 505 U.S. 577)
As to the secular purpose of the action, one could argue that the Court has allowed
a multitude of secular uses of God in the public realm. It is noted in the footnotes, even
as the Court struck down state-sponsored prayer in Engel, that the history of the United
States is littered with examples of national government support of public prayer, from the
announcement of national days of Thanksgiving from nearly every president since
Washington to congressional chaplains to the printing of the national motto, “In God We
Trust,” on all national currency. (Engel v. Vitale 370 U.S. 421) Though James Madison,
according to his own Memorial and Remonstrance (1785), rejected the notion of national
support of prayer, even he, when pressured by public opinion during the War of 1812,
issued a proclamation for a national day of prayer and fasting. (Madison 1814) He
justified his actions by claiming that the proclamation was merely a recommendation and
that it would favor no religion over another. This is the same claim made by the school
district in Lee. The presence of the rabbi was a secular tradition, the remarks he made
favored no religion over another, and students had the option of not attending the
graduation. (Lee v. Weisman 505 U.S. 577) Scalia’s dissent in Lee predicted how far this
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precedent can go in limiting the secular uses of God in public life. He foresaw, with
amazing accuracy, that someone would even someday challenge the inclusion of the
words “under God,” meant to inspire patriotism during a crisis of war, in the Pledge of
Allegiance. Ten years after the decision was issued in Lee, a claim was filed in
California challenging just those words. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
decided that case based on the precedent established by Lee. When the case moved to the
Supreme Court, Scalia recused himself. The Court dismissed the case based on a
standing issue. {Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow 000 U.S. 02-1624)
The three-pronged test requires that the state neither advance nor inhibit religious
practice. This was the one prong that the District Court claimed was violated by the state
of New York by inclusion of the rabbi at the graduation ceremony. {Lee v. Weisman 505
U.S. 577) That the prayer advances religion over irréligion seems an impressive
argument to make. Clearly, the inclusion of the rabbi gives students and parents the
impression that the state lends a certain respect and admiration to religious figures and
treats such people as special guest speakers at important ceremonies. However, the same
examples above provide a guide as to when support of religion in general is acceptable.
When Madison issued his national proclamation calling for a day of prayer and fasting,
according to the interpretations by the modem Court, he was promoting the practice of
religion over irréligion. The respondents in this case claimed, as did Madison, that the
non-coercive and non-denominational aspects of the action in question exempted it from
constitutional conflict. (Madison 1814) Under the precedent in Lemon, Madison’s action
could have been deemed unconstitutional, yet today’s presidents continue to call for
national days of prayer, fasting, and thanksgiving. It has become a national tradition. If
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the Court could exclude these actions for their traditional value as well as for the gravity
of the situations under which they are usually passed, then it would have been reasonable
for the respondents in Lee to believe that the Court could make a similar exception in the
case of graduation.
Finally, the last part of the three-pronged test requires that states not become
excessively entangled with religion. In issuing a pamphlet to the rabbi, the state,
according to the Court, entangled itself with religious activity. The pamphlet, which had
been written by religious organizations, directed the rabbi in the manner of keeping his
remarks non-denominational and tolerant. However, though there may have been tacit
coercion by the district in providing the pamphlet, the rabbi was never threatened with
any corrective action should he choose to make comments other than those deemed
acceptable by the guidelines of the pamphlet. {Lee v. Weisman 505 U.S. 577) If the state
was outside constitutional boundaries by providing guidelines to the speaker, many
questions remain as to the conduct of important state ceremonies, especially ceremonies
involving minors and parents. It is in this regard that the Establishment Clause begins to
more directly conflict with the provision protecting freedom of speech.
If the school cannot direct a religious leader to remain non-denominational in his
or her remarks at a public ceremony, then would those remarks be considered an
establishment of religion once they are uttered as the private speech of the religious
leader? Is the state to hereby refrain from inviting any religious leader or any person of
devout religious conscience to speak at a public function out of fear that their remarks
might be interpreted as Establishment? The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
recently took up these questions. When students at a Nebraska high school voted to
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include prayer in their graduation and generated a non-denominational prayer to be led by
a student speaker, a parent from the school filed for injunctive relief. The U.S. District
Court in Nebraska agreed to issue the injunction, halting the planned prayer.

At the

graduation ceremony, another parent, who happened to be on stage in his role as a school
board member, rose to speak as one parent to a sea of unsuspecting students and parents.
The parent recited the Lord’s Prayer, an overtly Christian expression of belief, and he
asked the crowd to join with him. This touched off a greater legal battle, as the parent
was a school board member and was speaking at a decidedly school-sponsored event.
The board, however, had not reviewed the man’s statements prior to the speech and
claimed no responsibility for the religious message. Faced with the challenge of
balancing free speech with the Establishment Clause protections, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit decided that the claimants were not due any protection
from the personal comments of this school board member. {John Doe v. The School
District o f the City ofNorfolkNo. 02-4135) If the school, according to Lemon, can have
absolutely no entanglement with religion, then the state is left with the option of simply
inviting speakers who may present any message, even an overtly religious or dangerous
one, to a solemn group of young people. Though this may square with the Framers’
intentions regarding free public speech, it seems at odds with Establishment Clause
precedent and the deeply held tradition of religious toleration in this country. However, it
follows precisely the precedent set in Lemon. The school board member was asked to
share an inspirational message as a parent, a clearly secular goal. The state act of inviting
him to speak was not based on his membership in any religious group and was not
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intended to advance or inhibit religion. Having not reviewed his comments, the state did
nothing to entangle itself with religious practice.
In his scathing dissent. Justice Scalia took aim at the precedent in Lemon. He
wrote, “Our Religion Clause jurisprudence has become bedeviled (so to speak) by
reliance on formulaic abstractions that are not derived from, but positively conflict with,
our long-accepted constitutional traditions. Foremost among these has been the so-called
Lemon test.. .which has received well-earned criticism from many Members of this
Court.” Scalia recounts the many instances of judicial conflict with this precedent and
hopes that the Court, by ignoring the precedent, has cast off the shadow of Lemon for
good. {Lee v. Weisman 505 U.S. 577) The case is still considered important legal
precedent. It is, however, a hazy precedent, and its noticeable absence from the decision
in Lee highlighted its main fault in that it does not seem to fulfill its function. The three
pronged test is not a sufficient guide for the Court in drawing the line between
accommodation of religious freedom and protection against state establishment in all
cases. Until such precedent is established, there is little hope for clarity in the area of
state establishment.

Marsh v. Chambers
Another useful precedent ignored by the Court was that set in the case of Marsh v.
Chambers (463 U.S. 783 1983), in which the Court ruled that the use of congressional
chaplains did not violate the Establishment Clause, since it was a ceremonial usage of
religion with deep roots in American history. The Court refused to classify the use of
prayer at graduation in a similar manner, claiming that significant differences existed in
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the context of the prayers which made the graduation prayer a form of government
support of religion while exempting the legislative ceremony. First, the Court asserted
that adults serving in a legislative environment could enter and leave the room as they
pleased during invocations without any notice being taken or any judgment being passed
as a result of their actions. Second, the Court asserted that a graduation prayer had more
influence over the minds of the graduating class members than a congressional invocation
would have over adult legislators. Last, the state control of the content of the graduation
prayer, in the form of the pamphlet, distinguished this practice from that of hiring a
chaplain who may direct the content of his own daily prayers. (Lee v. Weisman 505 U.S.
577)
Marsh is admittedly a singular exception to the Lemon test precedent, and the
Court took special note of its extraordinary circumstances. The precedent established in
Marsh had more to do with the tradition and history of the practice of congressional
chaplains, which predated even the writing of the federal Constitution. The Court held:
The practice of opening sessions of Congress with prayer has continued
without interruption for almost 200 years ever since the First Congress
drafted the First Amendment, and a similar practice has been followed for
more than a century in Nebraska and many other states. While historical
patterns, standing alone, cannot justify contemporary violations of
constitutional guarantees, historical evidence in the context of this case
sheds light not only on what the drafters of the First Amendment intended
the Establishment Clause to mean but also on how they thought that
Clause applied to the chaplaincy practice authorized by the First Congress.
In applying the First Amendment to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, it would be incongruous to interpret the Clause as imposing
more stringent First Amendment limits on the states than the draftsmen
imposed on the Federal Government. In light of the history, there can be
no doubt that the practice of opening legislative sessions with prayer has
become part of the fabric of our society. To invoke divine guidance on a
public body entrusted with making the laws is not, in these circumstances,
a violation of the Establishment Clause; it is simply a tolerable
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acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the people of this country.
(Marsh v. Chambers 463 U.S. 783)
Based on this peculiar historical context, the Court found no reason to believe that the
Constitution would have meant to eliminate the practice. Also, the Court had previous
recognized as exceptions, the particular uses of what Justice Sandra Day O’Connor has
come to name “secular deism” in the use of chaplains by the United States Congress,
presidential proclamations of days of prayer and fasting, and the invocation of God by the
marshal of the Supreme Court at the beginning of any day on which cases are heard in the
Court. The exceptions appear in the footnotes of Engel v. Vitale (370 U.S. 421).
In the case of Lee v. Weisman (505 U.S. 577), the Court rejected the historical
argument entirely. The Court noted that public education itself is a relatively new feature
of American democracy, therefore the existence of invocations and benedictions at public
school graduation ceremonies does not carry with it the full weight of history and
tradition of congressional prayer. As noted in Engel, among other school cases,
compulsory attendance laws create a very specific, state-sponsored, environment for
speech and religion in schools. (370 U.S. 421) School children are particularly
susceptible to indoctrination by school officials, since these officials are placed in a
position of authority over students in a school environment. Any religious utterance by
these respected authority figures may result in undue religious inculcation of students
against the will of the students or their parents.
In Lee, however, the Court was presented with a very different type of
environment, in which students are not required to be in attendance, and the importance
of the ceremony in the lives of the students might gives schools reason to believe that
ceremonial recognition of religion is appropriate. As the beginning of a congressional
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day might call for recognition of God’s guidance of elected representatives, the passage
of students from one phase of their lives into another might similarly call for recognition
of God’s blessings and guidance. In rejecting this argument, the Court drew the
following distinctions between the congressional environment and that of a graduation
Inherent differences between the public school system and a session of a
state legislature distinguish this case from Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S.
783 (1983). The considerations [505 U.S. 577, 597] we have raised in
objection to the invocation and benediction are, in many respects, similar
to the arguments we considered in Marsh. But there are also obvious
differences. The atmosphere at the opening of a session of a state
legislature, where adults are free to enter and leave with little comment
and for any number of reasons, cannot compare with the constraining
potential of the one school event most important for the student to attend.
The influence and force of a formal exercise in a school graduation are far
greater than the prayer exercise we condoned in Marsh. The Marsh
majority in fact gave specific recognition to this distinction, and placed
particular reliance on it in upholding the prayers at issue there. 463 U.S..
at 792 . Today's case is different. At a h i ^ school graduation, teachers
and principals must and do retain a high degree of control over the precise
contents of the program, the speeches, the timing, the movements, the
dress, and the decorum of the students. Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v.
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). In this atmosphere, the state-imposed
character of an invocation and benediction by clergy selected by the
school combine to make the prayer a state-sanctioned religious exercise in
which the student was left with no alternative but to submit. (Lee v.
Weisman 505 U.S. 577)
According to the majority opinion, the choice not to attend graduation was an untenable
one for a dissenter. Even though the graduation ceremony was technically not required
for receipt of a diploma, one could not expect a student to forgo such an important event
simply out of protest of a religious activity. Students were asked to remain standing
quietly during the graduation prayer, leaving no means for a dissenter to express his or
her dissent. To the common observer, the dissenter would be seen to be participating in
the prayer activity.
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Souter’s dissent disregarded the practice in Marsh as something of minimal
importance, claiming that most Americans take little notice of congressional prayer, days
of thanksgiving and fasting, and presidential proclamations of any religious variety. The
American public chooses to largely ignore these traditional aspects of government, while
it is seemingly impossible for a graduate and her family at a high school graduation to
ignore the direct government approval of religious activity. Souter noted,
Petitioners would deflect this conclusion by arguing that graduation
prayers are no different from presidential religious proclamations and
similar official "acknowledgments" of religion in public life. But religious
invocations in Thanksgiving Day addresses and the like, rarely noticed,
ignored without effort, conveyed over an impersonal medium, and
directed at no one in particular, inhabit a pallid zone worlds apart from
official prayers delivered to a captive audience of public school students
and their families. {Lee v. Weisman 505 U.S. 577)
In dravdng the distinctions between the congressional and graduation environment, the
Court rejects the argument that graduation prayers are a form of ceremonial deism.
In his dissent. Justice Scafia took the majority to task for the broad strokes it took
with the Marsh precedent. In Marsh, the Court had noted that the practice of
congressional chaplains predated the U.S. Constitution, while in Lee no such claim was
possible since publicly fiinding schooling was such a new addition to the framework of
U.S. government. Scafia noted that, at the very least, prayer at public school graduation
predated the Fourteenth Amendment, through which the First Amendment was applied to
state governments. He claimed that the majority opinion, “lays waste a tradition that is as
old as public school ceremonies themselves, and that is a component of an even more
longstanding American tradition of non-sectarian prayer to God at public celebrations
generally.” Scafia went on to detail the public tradition as well as to describe the first
recorded public school graduation in history. {Lee v. Weisman 505 U.S. 577)
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With regard to the Court’s distinction of the ability of adults in Congress to show
dissent without even being noticed, in that they can enter and leave the room at will,
Scalia pointed out three poignant facts. First, the students in question are graduating,
marking a transition from youth to adulthood, yet the Court treated them the same as it
would treat first graders in an elementary school classroom for the time that they were
involved in the ceremony. Second, students were asked to stand quietly with bowed
heads during the reading of invocations and benedictions, yet there was no punishment
for either raising one’s head or for sitting down, granting dissenters the right to express
their dissent reasonably. Third, that remaining respectfully silent while another expresses
his or her belief is a civic skill that students should be taught. {Lee v. Weisman 505 U.S.
577)
The rejection of the precedent of Marsh created another situation in which school
prayer became the exception to an otherwise accepted constitutional rule. The Court has
repeatedly been willing to recognize the traditional practice of invoking the name of the
creator during crises or important events. Although Madison is widely viewed as a
separationist (Lindsay 1991), even he issued three separate proclamations of days of
prayer and fasting during a time of war. {Lee v. Weisman 505 U.S. 577) As Van Alstyne
suggests, “the Court has rejected a number of arguments still troublesome to the
historically-minded.” (1963) The case of Lee provides some of these arguments.
The Court here stated that public accommodation of an historical religious
tradition through prayers offered by Congress, the President, and even the marshal of the
Supreme Court itself has no bearing on a public school atmosphere, even in a one-time
important ceremony such as graduation. In short, prayer in school could be
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accommodated the way that other publie prayer can. The rejeetion of the prineiple of
Lemon basically stated that accommodation of religion through prayer is somehow
fimdamentally different than accommodation of religion through taxpayer support, the
latter of which was more directly the aim of the First Amendment when it was
constructed. Therefore, through this troubling precedent, the Court defined the school
environment as something that does not resemble the world outside of it, the world for
which students are meant to be prepared through the process of schooling.

Coercion
Much of the debate in Lee revolved around tiie issue of state coercion of religious
activity. According to the Weismans’ and subsequently, the Court’s decision, the
invocation and benediction offered at the public school graduation reeked of state
coercion as demonstrated by the request that students remain standing with bowed heads
during both events and the sense that students felt obligated to attend the graduation
ceremony. The school argued that remaining silent did not force participation in the
prayer and that the graduation ceremony was purely optional. In turn, the Court focused
much of its attention on the rights of the reasonable dissenter in the situation presented.
{Lee V. Weisman 505 U.S. 577)
Justice Souter rightfidly noted in his concurrence, “The Framers adopted the
Religion Clauses in response to a long tradition of coercive state support for religion,
particularly in the form of tax assessments.” {Lee v. Weisman 505 U.S. 577) Madison
and Jefferson firmly objected to such a tax in the state of Virginia. (Madison 1785)
Supreme Court precedent even prior to Lee seems to allow this type of coercion {Everson
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V.

Board o f Education 330 U.S. 1, Zorach v. Clauson 343 U.S. 306) while Lee rejects a

much more subtle and indefinable type of coercion. In fact, these two different types of
precedent have led to a further broadening of Establishment Clause interpretation with
respect to the use of tax money in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (0536 U.S. 639) while
interpretation in regards to prayer services on school property has been further narrowed.
{Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe 530 U.S. 290) The difference between
these two types of cases plays on the role of coercion or choice. According to modem
Court interpretation, school vouchers are acceptable accommodation because parents
exert choice in directing the voucher contributions to the parochial or public school of
their choosing. The Court defines the school environment, even at extra-curricular
activities, to be fiuught with subtle coercive pressure that prey on young, fragile minds,
even when students have the choice to participate or not in said non-denominational
religious activities.
In Lee, the Court created a broad definition of coercion not based on legal
sanction but based on the psychology of adolescents. According to Justice Anthony
Kennedy’s majority opinion, the simple request that students stand with heads bowed
during the ceremony was enough to constitute an indirect, subtle coercive power creating
a psychological pressure to at least appear to participate in the religious activity. He
stated:
The undeniable fact is that the school district's supervision and control of a
high school graduation ceremony places public pressure, as well as peer
pressure, on attending students to stand as a group or, at least, maintain
respectfiil silence during the invocation and benediction. This pressure,
though subtle and indirect, can be as real as any overt compulsion. Of
course, in our culture, standing or remaining silent can signify adherence
to a view or simple respect for the views of others. And no doubt some
persons who have no desire to join a prayer have little objection to
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standing as a sign of respect for those who do. But for the dissenter of high
school age, who has a reasonable perception that she is being forced by the
State to pray in a manner her conscience will not allow, the injury is no
less real. There can be no doubt that for many, if not most, of the students
at the graduation, the act of standing or remaining silent was an expression
of participation in the rabbi's prayer. That was the very point of the
religious exercise. It is of little comfort to a dissenter, then, to be told that,
for her, the act of standing or remaining in silence signifies mere respect,
rather than participation. {Lee v. Weisman 505 U.S. 577)
Therefore, what one might see as an act of respect, the dissenter interprets as an act of
coercion to participate in religious activities. This is not the direct coercion of taking tax
money from an individual in order to transfer such payment to a religiously sponsored
activity, nor is it the coercion of punishment of dissent according to conscience.
According to the Court, the coercion lies in the fact that the dissenter feels, whether it is
truth or not, that he or she simply cannot dissent without boycotting a ceremony marking
an important life event.
The First Amendment exists to protect freedom of conscience in religious and
political matters as well as the expression of those beliefs with minimal government
interference. Justice Harry Blackmun’s concurrence claimed, “There is no doubt that
attempts to aid religion through government coercion jeopardize freedom of conscience.
Even subtle pressure diminishes the right of each individual to choose voluntarily what to
believe.” {Lee v Weisman 505 U.S. 577) This echoes Madison’s claim that religious
belief and practice can be directed only by the individual’s conscience and will, not by
the government’s direction or intervention. (Madison 1785) Still the claim that the
government was somehow forcing students to participate in a religious activity simply by
requesting that they stand in respect for a religious speaker at a government ceremony
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seems to lack merit. The Court’s decision relies, instead, on an indirect, intangible,
subtle psychological coercion.
Scalia’s scathing dissent on the coercion issue claimed that the “Court has gone
beyond the realm where judges know what they are doing. The Court’s argument that
state officials have ‘coerced’ students to take part in the invocation and benediction at
graduation ceremonies is, not to put too fine a point on it, incoherent.” {Lee v. Weisman
505 U.S. 577) In fact, dissenting students still had a means of expressing their dissent
without being overly disruptive of the ceremony, Scalia pointed out.
This assertion - the very linchpin of the Court's opinion - is almost as
intriguing for what it does not say as for what it says. It does not say, for
example, that students are psychologically coerced to bow their heads,
place their hands in a Durer-like prayer position, pay attention to the
prayers, utter "Amen," or in fact pray. (Perhaps further intensive
psychological research remains to be done on these matters.) It claims
only that students are psychologically coerced "to stand . . . or, at least,
maintain respectful silence."
He further accused the Court of not giving enough thought to the test of psychological
coercion in a particularly ominous statement noting that the Court seemed not to bother at
all with the fact that students had, only moments previous, stood in solemn respect for the
Pledge of Allegiance, which now contains the phrase “under God,” possibly raising a
similar Establishment Clause issue. Scalia implied that under the psychological coercion
test applied to the prayer, it would be just as unconstitutional for the state to coerce
students to stand in respect of a declared allegiance to the United States government, in
that the First Amendment protects fi-eedom of conscience in regard to government policy
as well as to religion. As Scalia puts it, “I see no warrant for expanding the concept of
coercion beyond acts backed by threat of penalty.”
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Scalia’s dissent brought up the important notion of broadening the Establishment
Clause to the point that no government accommodation of religion is permissible, thereby
negating, in certain circumstances, the Free Exercise Clause. Also, if government,
especially schools, can have no interaction with religious belief, then the study of
American history and government will be lacking in content and clarity, as so much of
the history and tradition of the United States has, at its core, a set of religious belief. This
is why Scalia listed, again, the many instances of public recognition of God in
government ceremonies. {Lee v. Weisman 505 U.S. 577)
The Court also argued that the graduation ceremony itself was obligatory in a
“real and fair” sense. Although students could have choosen not to attend the ceremony,
that seemed an untenable position, to the Court, for a student at a crossroads in his or her
life to forego the graduation ceremony out of a wish to dissent from prayer at such a
ceremony. The argument about the importance of the affair was two-fold; however, as
such an important event may warrant a prayer service. Kennedy discussed the double
edge of this argument when he wrote, “The importance of the event is the point the
school district and the United States rely upon to argue that a formal prayer ought to be
permitted, but it becomes one of the principal reasons the argument must fail.” {Lee v.
Weisman 505 U.S. 577) Scalia struck back.
But let us assume the very worst, that the nonparticipating graduate is
"subtly coerced". . . to stand! Even that half of the disjunctive does not
remotely establish a "participation" (or an "appearance of participation")
in a religious exercise. The Court acknowledges that, "in our culture,
standing . . . can signify adherence to a view or simple respect for the
views of others." Ibid. (Much more often the latter than the former, I think,
except perhaps in the proverbial town meeting, where one votes by
standing.) But if it is a permissible inference that one who is standing is
doing so simply out of respect for the prayers of others that are in
progress, then how can it possibly be said that a "reasonable dissenter. . .
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could believe that the group exercise signified her own participation or
approval"? Quite obviously, it cannot. I may add, moreover, that
maintaining respect for the religious observances of others is a
fimdamental civic virtue that government (including the public schools)
can and should cultivate - so that, even if it were the case that the
displaying of such respect might be mistaken for taking part in the prayer,
I would deny that the dissenter's interest in avoiding even the false
appearance of participation constitutionally trumps the government's
interest in fostering respect for religion generally.
Therefore, according to Scalia, even if students are coerced, it is not necessarily an
unconstitutional endorsement of religion, but more a civic exercise in keeping with the
tradition of graduation ceremonies and American public recognition of God in general.
The Framers of the First Amendment sought to prevent the kind of religious
establishments in which person were forced to support religion, usually through taxation.
(Annals 1 1790) There is a long, recognized history of recognition of God at public
functions by Congress, the President, and even the Court itself. {Engel v. Vitale 370 U.S.
421) This tradition found its way into the very first recorded public school graduation.
{Lee V. Weisman 505 U.S. 577, Scalia in dissent) Although the Court recognized the
tradition in other environments {Marsh v. Chambers 463 U.S. 783), it refused to
recognize the traditional nature of prayer at school graduations as an effect of the “subtle
coercive pressure” exerted on students in a school-sponsored environment. This coercion
is not the type that the Framers had in mind when constructing the First Amendment.
Nowhere in the writings of the Framers is found any reference to subtle psychological
pressures of being asked to stand out of respect.
The Court paid little mind to the nondenominational nature of the prayer or to the
fact that no student was forced to pray, claiming that the idea that the prayer simply
offered a choice to attending students is misleading. Even Justice Souter’s concurrence
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recognized that Madison, deemed the chief author of the Establishment Clause, argued
that his proclamations of prayer and fasting were mitigated by the fact that they were
mere suggestions and condoned no particular religion. Although Souter called this an
admission of backsliding, it does give some credence to the argument the rabbi’s
invocation offered a chance for prayer for those who wished to join. {Lee v. Weisman
505 U.S. 577) The weight of argument laid at the feet of the student dissenter, allows the
dissenter a sort of heckler’s veto over a traditional event.

State Sponsorship of Religious Activity
In concurrence. Justice Blackmun recognized the fact that Supreme Court
precedent in the area of school prayer does not require coercion of the student in order to
effect a violation of the Establishment Clause. He wrote, “proof of government coercion
is not necessary to prove an Establishment Clause violation.” {Lee v. Weisman 505 U.S.
577) Therefore, the discussion of coercion can even be considered inconsequential given
the overt state sponsorship of a religious activity as evidenced by the choice of the Rabbi
as a speaker at graduation and the direction of the content of the prayer through use of the
pamphlet. Kennedy stated, “The government involvement with religious activity in this
case is pervasive, to the point of creating a state-sponsored and state-directed religious
exercise in a public school.” {Lee v. Weisman 505 U.S. 577)
Again, the Court departed from precedent to identify prayer in school as a very
specific instance of state sponsorship of religion that is not allowed, whereas other forms
of sponsorship are allowed. The Court allowed release time {Zorach v. Clauson 343 U.S.
306) and use of school facilities for meetings of religious groups. {Westside Community
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Board o f Education v. Mergens 496 U.S. 226) State sponsorship of prayer and similar
religious activity is allowed in the case of congressional chaplains {Marsh v. Chambers
463 U.S. 783) and military chaplains {Katcoff v. Marsh 755 F.2d 223). While striking
down non-denominational prayer in schools, the Court littered Engel with footnotes
detailing acceptable government sponsorship of religion outside the public school sphere.
(370 U.S. 421)

The Aftermath of Lee
Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe (530 U.S. 290)
The precedent set by Lee v. Weisman as well as Lemon v. Kurtzman swept so
broadly as to be interpreted less than a decade later as prohibiting student-led, studentchosen prayer at public school football games. Since the school had allowed and
encouraged the election of a student-chaplain for such events, the Court concluded that,
“These invocations are authorized by a government policy and take place on government
property at government-sponsored school-related events.” {Santa Fe Independent School
District v. Doe 530 U.S. 290) It seems as if simply the fact that the school was aware that
the student chaplain was elected to utter a religious statement in a school context places
the stamp of approval upon the utterance, claiming that the school policy actually
encouraged religious messages, although it did not specifically indicate in its policy what
types of messages the student speaker would be allowed to convey. The Court objected to
the idea that election of a chaplain by a majority vote would promote both democracy and
a sort of tradition civic religion. Instead, the opinion argued that such votes demean and
dismiss minority viewpoints fi-om the public sphere. Relying on Lee, the Court asserted
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that the football prayer is coercive to the students who would like to participate in
extracurricular activities. Again, the claim that the choice between participation and
protest was an untenable one for the average student dissenter is reasserted. Further, the
Court made this decision before any student speaker uttered a word, arguing that even the
mere threat of a religious message was enough to strike down the policy on its face.
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent focused on the reassertion of the Lemon test in
school prayer settings, claiming that a Lemon test assessment of the policy would show
that the election of the student speaker did not violate the test and actually protected
freedom of speech and exercise. Rehnquist then detailed the many divergences the Court
has taken from the Lemon test, arguing that the test should be abolished since it is so
unclear. He concluded, “The policy at issue here may be applied in an unconstitutional
manner, but it will be time enough to invalidate it if it is found to be the case.” {Lee v.
Weisman 505 U.S. 577)
In short. Doe used the precedent in Lee to basically invalidate any religious
utterance on school grounds that does not take place in a club setting. The non-coercive
nature of the prayer, even at a completely optional event, does not bear on the
constitutionality of the prayer. The student-led nature of the activity does not bear on the
constitutionality of the prayer. The democratic nature of the activity does not bear on the
constitutionality of the prayer. More importantly, the free exercise and speech rights of
the speaker do not bear on the constitutionality of the prayer. Seemingly, it is enough
that the school was aware that a religious message might have been uttered for the
activity to be struck down in accordance with the Establishment Clause of the
Constitution.
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For accomodationists, this turn in precedent was a frightening affront to the
history and tradition of non-sectarian public prayer in the United States. It is a
misrepresentation of the purpose of the Framers of the amendment. It is an
overbroadening of the Establishment Clause. It is, furthermore, out of step with other
Establishment Clause precedent regarding public funding and accommodation of
religious behavior and belief in public places.
Elk Grove Independent School District v. Newdow (000 U.S. 02-1624)
The most recent effect of Lee on American jurisprudence is the challenge to the
phrase “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance. In his dissent, Scalia foresaw this
challenge when he wrote.
The opinion manifests that the Court itself has not given careful
consideration to its test of psychological coercion. For if it had, how could
it observe, with no hint of concern or disapproval, that students stood for
the Pledge of Allegiance, which immediately preceded Rabbi Gutterman's
invocation? Ante, at 583. The government can, of course, no more coerce
political orthodoxy than religious orthodoxy. West [505 U.S. 577, 639]
Virginia Bd. of E d v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624.642 (1943). Moreover,
since the Pledge of Allegiance has been revised since Barnette to include
the phrase "under God," recital of the Pledge would appear to raise the
same Establishment Clause issue as the invocation and benediction. If
students were psychologically coerced to remain standing during the
invocation, they must also have been psychologically coerced, moments
before, to stand for (and thereby, in the Court's view, take part in or appear
to take part in) the Pledge. Must the Pledge therefore be barred from the
public schools (both from graduation ceremonies and from the
classroom)? In Barnette, we held that a public school student could not be
compelled to recite the Pledge; we did not even hint that she could not be
compelled to observe respectful silence - indeed, even to stand in
respectful silence - when those who wished to recite it did so. Logically,
that ought to be the next project for the Court's bulldozer.
A decade later, Michael Newdow, on behalf of his biological daughter, filed that very
challenge. Although the Court struck down the challenge based on Newdow’s custodial
relationship with the child, many justices felt impelled to comment on the merits of the
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case. Given his many public statements regarding die issue, Scalia recused himself from

the case, leaving the most vehement voice on the Court to be Justice Thomas. {Elk Grove
Independent School District v. Newdow 000 U.S. 02-1624)
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor took the opportunity to reaffirm the constitutional
soundness of making reference to God in public ceremonies, but did not lay blame for the
incorrect judgment of the lower court at the feet of an incorrect decision in Lee.
O’Connor applied what she calls an “endorsement test” based on expected reaction and
interpretation of a reasonable observer in a social context rich with history and tradition.
Where she failed to recognize the traditional value of invocations and benedictions at
graduations ceremonies, a traditional activity that dated back to the mid nineteenth
century, she recognized a traditional significance in the use of “under God” in the Pledge
of Allegiance when the phrase was added in the mid twentieth century. She noted.
The Court has permitted government, in some instances, to refer to or
commemorate religion in public life. See, e.g., Pinette, supra; Allegheny,
supra; Lynch, supra; Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 (1983). While the
Court's explicit rationales have varied, my own has been consistent; I
believe that although these references speak in the language of religious
belief, they are more properly understood as employing the idiom for
essentially secular purposes. One such purpose is to commemorate the role
of religion in our history. In my view, some references to religion in
public life and government are the inevitable consequence of our Nation's
origins. Just as the Court has refused to ignore changes in the religious
composition of our Nation in explaining the modem scope of the Religion
Clauses, see, e.g., Wallace, supra, at 52-54 (even if the Religion Clauses
were originally meant only to forestall intolerance between Christian sects,
they now encompass all forms of religious conscience), it should not deny
that our history has left its mark on our national traditions. It is
unsurprising that a Nation founded by religious refugees and dedicated to
religious freedom should find references to divinity in its symbols, songs,
mottoes, and oaths.*- Eradicating such references would sever ties to a
history that sustains this Nation even today. {Elk Grove Independent
School District v. Newdow 000 U.S. 02-1624)
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According to O’Connor’s endorsement test, it is appropriate to acknowledge God in a
patriotic manner but not in a manner that is purely traditional without reference to the
history and tradition of the United States. Given the invocation that the rabbi had written
for the graduation in question in Lee, it is difficult to see O’Connor’s dissatisfaction with
the outcome of the school sponsored activity. The prayer read,
God of the Free, Hope of the Brave:
For the legacy of America where diversity is celebrated and the rights of
minorities are protected, we thank You. May these young men and women grow
up to enrich it.
For the liberty of America, we thank You. May these new graduates grow up to
guard it.
For the political process of America in which all its citizens may participate, for
its court system where all may seek justice, we thank You. May those we honor
this morning always turn to it in trust.
For the destiny of America, we thank You. May the graduates of Nathan Bishop
Middle School so live that they might help to share it.
May our aspirations for our country and for these young people, who are our hope
for the future, be richly fulfilled.
AMEN {Lee v. Weisman 505 U.S. 577)
The prayer’s specific mention of patriotic traditions might make it acceptable. The fact
that the content may have been influenced by the pamphlet given to the rabbi in
preparation for the event; however, seems to have been a particular point of contention in
Lee.
O’Connor’s endorsement test fails here. If patriotic and traditional recognition of
God in public ceremonies is acceptable, but controlling the content of religious messages
in a school context is unacceptable, then schools are left with no choice but to disregard
and abandon traditional prayer practices in all instances, including the Pledge of
Allegiance. It is unclear why it is acceptable for Congress to incorporate religious
messages into public formats such as the Pledge, congressional prayer, and the
imprintation of the national motto on money, while it is unconstitutional for schools to try
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to incorporate religious messages into public formats while trying to maintain a
traditional non-sectarian, non-coercive format. The wording of the Establishment Clause
and its original interpretation would guide the Court in the opposite direction, stripping
Congress of this right and granting it to state governments.
Rehnquist also accepted the legitimacy of the Pledge without specifically
attacking Lee. He recounted, yet again, the tradition of religious invocation in the public
sphere from George Washington to modem presidents. He then laments that the same
problem that arises in Lee, the introduction of the heckler’s veto that grants so much
power to the dissenter that the rights of the majority are restricted. Rehnquist wrote.
There is no doubt that respondent is sincere in his atheism and rejection of
a belief in God. But the mere fact that he disagrees with this part of the
Pledge does not give him a veto power over the decision of the public
schools that willing participants should pledge allegiance to the flag in the
manner prescribed by Congress. There may be others who disagree, not
with the phrase "under God," but with the phrase "with liberty and justice
for all." But surely that would not give such objectors the right to veto the
holding of such a ceremony by those willing to participate. Only if it can
be said that the phrase "under God" somehow tends to the establishment of
a religion in violation of the First Amendment can respondent's claim
succeed, where one based on objections to "with liberty and justice for all"
fails. Our cases have broadly interpreted this phrase, but none have gone
anywhere near as far as the decision of the Court of Appeals in this case.
The recital, in a patriotic ceremony pledging allegiance to the flag and to
the Nation, of the descriptive phrase "under God" cannot possibly lead to
the establishment of a religion, or anything like it. {Elk Grove Independent
School District v. Newdow 000 U.S. 02-1624)
Rehnquist believed, as do many, that the Court had expanded the interpretation of the
Establishment Clause so far as to become oppressive to the free expression of the nations
citizens and also restrictive of the nation’s traditions.
Clarence Thomas, the most vocal commentator in the Pledge case, took the Court
to task for the decades of Establishment Clause precedent that led to the current problem.
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including the Everson v. Board o f Education case which incorporated the Establishment
Clause to the states. He wrote, “I would welcome the opportunity to consider more fully
the difficult questions whether and how the Establishment Clause applies against the
States. One observation suffices for now: As strange as it sounds, an incorporated
Establishment Clause prohibits exactly what the Establishment Clause protected—state
practices that pertain to ‘an establishment of religion.’” Justice Thomas argued that the
Establishment Clause never should have been incorporated, since incorporation is
reserved for fimdamental individual liberties, and, as he claimed, the protection against
Establishment is not an individual liberty but a protection of the states against federal
infringement. Thomas lays the blame for the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit squarely on the Supreme Court’s precedent in Lee. Thomas’ concern
with Lee revolved around the fact that it expanded precedent so far as to prohibit even the
slightest recognition of God in a school context. Thomas argues,
I conclude that, as a matter of our precedent, the Pledge policy is
unconstitutional. I believe, however, that Lee was wrongly decided. Lee
depended on a notion of "coercion" that, as I discuss below, has no basis
in law or reason. The kind of coercion implicated by the Religion Clauses
is that accomplished "by force o f law and threat ofpenalty." 505 U. S.. at
640 {Scalia, J., dissenting); see id, at 640-645. Peer pressure, unpleasant
as it may be, is not coercion. But rejection of Zee-style "coercion" does
not suffice to settle this case. Although children are not coerced to pledge
their allegiance, they are legally coerced to attend school. Cf., e.g.,
Schempp, supra; Engel v. Vitcile, 370 U. S. 421 (1962). Because what is at
issue is a state action, the question becomes whether the Pledge policy
implicates a religious liberty right protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. {Elk Grove Independent School District v. Newdow 000 U.S.
02-1624)
Therefore, the problem with the Lee case stemmed from the distortion of the
Establishment Clause fi'om a protection of federalism to an individual right, added to the
Engel contortion of the meaning of coercion. By these precedents, the recognition of
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God in the Pledge of Allegiance in a school context would violate the Establishment
Clause while the same words uttered in a congressional context or by a president at a
public event would pass constitutional muster.

Conclusion
The precedent in Lee needlessly departed from the precedents in both Lemon and
Marsh. Depending on interpretation, the Court could have chosen to strike down the
graduation prayer using either precedent. Appellate courts had argued that the prayer
violated two or three of the prongs of the Lemon test. {Lee v. Weisman 505 U.S. 577)
Still, the Court disregarded Lemon, partially due to its inability to clarify the boundaries
of government accommodation of religion or traditional activities. Marsh, on the other
hand, dealt directly with the role of traditional secular deism in public ceremony. The
Court cast off Marsh as not relating to the particularly sensitive environment created by
school. The Court instead relied on precedent set in Engel v. Vitale, a previous school
prayer case, and one of the more controversial decisions in Court history, if only for its
disregard of the traditional role of morality and religion in the public school classroom.
{Engel V. Vitale 370 U.S. 421) This break from more widely accepted precedent and the
continuation of the segregation of the school environment from the adult world in the
area of religion seems to have deepened confusion regarding the meaning of the
Establishment Clause. Monetary support of religion in schools relies on different
precedent than state recognition of religious activity which relies on different precedent
than state sponsored prayer in places other than school which relies on different
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precedent than school prayer. Each of these situations invokes a unique interpretation of
the Clause.
Lee deepened the divide between Court and public on the issue of school prayer.
Polling data show that parents and students are still interested in incorporating some
recognition of a higher power into public school events. (Green and Guth 1989; Jacoby
1990; Servin- Gonzalez and Torres-Reyna 1999) The Court also granted an
overpowering right of religious minorities and dissenters to stop non-denominational,
non-coercive practices on the basis that they are state sponsored. Rather than rule by
majority with respect to the minority, this continued the development of a system of
precedent by which the minority rules, giving more credence to the rights of nonobservers that to the system of tradition and history that endorses the practice of prayer at
public ceremonies. (Way and Burt 1983)
The majority decision in Lee also expanded the conception of coercion in
American jurisprudence, but only as it applies to children in a school setting. Where the
Court had previously admitted a long tradition of non-sectarian public support of religion
in many cases, reiterated in Lee by Justice Antonin Scalia, Justice Souter disregarded this
entire history as misinterpretations of the Establishment Clause. The majority, however,
upheld many of these public recognitions of God. The Court treated the schoolhouse as
an entirely different type of environment, rife with coercive forces and restrictions on
expression. {Lee v. Weisman 505 U.S. 577) This not only separated the school
environment from the adult environment, even at graduation, which is supposed to mark
a transition from youth to adulthood, it also separated the protections of expression of
non-religious beliefs in school campuses from other forms of expression and dissent in
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the same environment. {Tinker v. Des Moines School District 393 U.S. 503 , West
Virginia State board o f Education v. Barnette 319 U.S. 624 ) If the Court had chosen to
follow the precedent set in a decision only two years prior to Lee, it may have chosen to
allow the religious expression even with state support. Westside Community Board o f
Education v. Mergens allows the expression of religious beliefs by students, even with
the state support of a state-funded teacher-adviser who administrates the activities if the
religious group. (496 U.S. 226)
The effects of Lee drove a wedge between traditional practices and the
requirements of the Court. It led to the facial challenge of a pre-game prayer practice in
Texas that was democratically supported by students of the district in question. {Sante Fe
Independent School District v. Doe 530 U.S.290) The most recent scandal that has
grovra out of the Lee decision has been the challenge to the phrase “under God” in the
Constitution. {Elk Grove Independent School District v. Newdow 000 U.S. 1264)
Although the Court sidestepped the merits in the case by denying standing to Michael
Newdow, he has refiled the case in the federal district courts under different
circumstances.
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CHAPTER 5

POLICY GOALS AND A MODEST PROPOSAL
Goals
It should be no surprise that with differing definitions of problems associated with
school prayer policy, separationists and accomodationists disagree as to the goals of the
Establishment Clause protections as they apply to school prayer. First of all, the main
goal of any policy in the American republic is to provide representation of majority
opinions with respect to minority rights. Conflicting claims to rights under the
Establishment Clause and under the Free Exercise complicate the issue fiirther with
accomodationists claiming violations of their free exercise rights and separationists
claiming violation of the Establishment Clause. Though the issue of majority sentiment is
clear (Green and Guth 1989; Jacoby 1990; Servin- Gonzalez and Torres-Reyna 1999), the
definition of minority rights is not.
Accomodationist goals include the maintenance of religious tradition. Alexis de
Tocqueville observed that the fate of democracy rested on the strength of its religious
tradition, and that even diverse traditions can be adapted to a Democracy. (Tocqueville
Democracv in America Volume 1 Part 2 Chapter 9) Key founders of the United States
government who were famous for their religious skepticism still supported the need for
religious education in the maintenance of a firee society. (Reichley 1986) In fostering
religious tradition and practice in the public schools, accomodationists seek to provide a
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respect for the religious traditions of the nation and a solid foundation for democratic
government.
Until 1963, it seems, the prayer supporters were upfront about their goals. Both
petitioners and respondents in the case of Engel v. Vitale (370 U.S. 421) agreed that the
Regents’ Prayer was a religious practice, but the respondents claimed that there was a
state interest in encouraging religious activity. Separationists see no state interest. Since
then, accomodationists have tried to couch their religious goals in relatively secular
language. Since the problem in Engel seemed to be that the state had written the prayer
and that there may be subtle coercion, the state of Alabama authorized a statute that
would provide public school children with a moment of silence for prayer and meditation.
The goal was the same, to support religious activity and respect the tradition of beginning
a day with prayer. The Court struck this provision down as well. {Wallace v. Jajfree 472
U.S. 38) Since then the accomodationists have relied on the footnotes from Engel which
allow ceremonial usage (370 U.S. 421) to justify prayer at graduation {Lee v. Weisman
505 U.S. 577) and prayer at the beginning of football games {Santa Fe Independent
School District v. DOE 530 U.S. 290) Each of these cases tried to cast prayer in the light
of a secular tradition that could really neither further nor inhibit anyone’s practices, but
the implied goal of the tradition was to encourage religious activity according to the
Court.
Separationists seek to protect non-believers and believers alike from government
involvement in religious practices. Their goal is to drive a wedge of separation between
church and state, and in the matter of school prayer, each decision has driven the wedge
deeper. This wedge protects religion from state interference and protects people from the
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fervors o f religious persecution. (Carroll 1967) The ultimate goal of the separationist is

to eradicate prayer or any religious activity from public schools. None of the
compromises, such as moments of non-denominational prayer, non-coercive prayer,
student-led prayer, and ceremonial prayer, have been acceptable to the separationists.

Policy Alternatives
School prayer is often seen as an all or nothing endeavor. Either the school
supports prayer or it does not. There are, however, many alternatives to the win-lose
approach that the Court has taken in school prayer cases. There may be a way to satisfy
the main goals of each side of the argument, respect tradition, encourage moral values,
and still protect the rights of non-believers. Below, find a matrix of policy alternatives
and their probable effects. Of course, many of these effects are perceived. The
assumption that believers and non-believers deserve the same protection is taken as a
given. The chart focuses on daily prayer, and does not reference prayer at special events
such as graduations and football games.
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Policy

Perceived effect

Alternative
Status Quo

The right of non-believers to be free of religious coercion will remain
protected. Government and religion will remain unentangled.
Believers will perceive a restriction in their freedom of expression.
Majority opinion and some state action will continue to be out of step
with established Court doctrine. Believers will perceive a loss of
tradition and moral value.

Daily Moment of Non-believers may perceive some mild coercion to take part in
Silence

religious practices. Government will be acting in support of religious
practice though it will not identify a specific sect or type of activity
that is supported. The purpose of tiie law would be to advance
religious practice, in violation of modem Establishment Clause
interpretation. {Wallace v. Jajfree 472 U.S. 38) The free exercise of
believers would be protected. Tradition would be preserved. There
may be little or no effect on the moral education of the children who
may need more guidance.
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Non-

Non-believers may perceive subtle coercion. The state government

Denominational,

would be directly involved in the overt support of a religious action.

Non-Coercive,

Engel V. Vitale (370 U.S. 421) would have to be overturned. There is

state-written

inherent difficulty in writing a prayer with which all denominations

daily prayer led

would agree. Free exercise rights of believers would be protected.

by teachers

Tradition would be preserved. The prayer may have some effect on
the moral education and values of children. The state’s involvement
would preserve principles of federalism and community standards of
morality. Involvement of facidty might violate Free Exercise rights
of faculty and might lend undue state sanction to the activity.

Non-

Non-believers may perceive coercion. The state government would

Denominational,

be directly involved in the overt support of a religious action. Engel

Non-Coercive

V.

daily prayer led

inherent difficulty in writing a law with which all denominations

by guest clergy

would agree. Free Exercise rights of believers would be protected,

Vitale (370 U.S. 421) would have to be overturned. There is

however some believers would object to the sectarian nature of guest
clergy. Tradition would be preserved. The prayer may have some
effect on the moral education and values of children. The state’s
involvement would preserve principles or federalism and community
standards of morality. This activity would seem to coincide with
accepted government ceremonial usage of clergy.
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Non-

Non-believers might perceive peer coercion. The state would be

denominatîonal,

directly involved in support of an overt religious action. Free

Non-coercive,

exercise rights of believers would be protected. Tradition would be

student-written

preserved. The prayer may have some effect on the moral education

and student-led

and values of children. State involvement would preserve principles

daily prayer

of federalism and community standards of morality. There are
inherent problems in writing a prayer to which all denominations can
agree. There are inherent problems in student volunteer selection and
administrative approval of the prayer.

Community non-

Non-believers may feel coercion. Majority sect of a community

denominational,

might exert undo influence over the creation of the accepted prayer.

non-coercive

Free exercise rights of believers would be maintained. Tradition

prayer prepared

would be preserved. The prayer might have an effect on the moral

by citizen board

education and values of children. The state’s involvement is

for reading by

marginal, but the state is still supporting a religious activity. There is

student

an inherent problem with writing a prayer to which all denominations

volunteers

can agree. Principles of federalism and community standards are
upheld. Largely secular communities could choose to have no prayer
while religious communities could choose a prayer that suits their
needs. Consistent with aspects of religious choice recently infused
into the Establishment Clause interpretation. (Zelman v. SimmonsHarris 000 U.S. 000-1751) Majoritarian aspects of democracy would
be maintained.
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Let it be noted that each alternative is riddled with problems, and that the
difficulty in a democratic republic is to balance the rights of competing groups. Though
the status quo is acceptable to separationists, prayer supporters find it distasteful and even
dangerous. (Reichley 1986) None of the above policy alternatives suggests a return to
colonial days of established religion, nor does any one of them suggest a completely
sectarian approach to the problem of school prayer. Some changes would have to be
made to established Supreme Court rulings regarding the conflict between school prayer
and the Establishment Clause, but these changes might help to clarify the clause so that
there is one, easily understandable definition that applies to all establishment cases.
Instead, there is currently disagreement between Establishment cases involving school
funding, such as Zelman (536 U.S. 639), and those involving prayer, such as Doe.
(530 U.S. 290)

Policy Proposal
Of the aforementioned policy objectives, one seems to be the best at balancing the
rights of believers and non-believers, marrying the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses, and creating a more consistent view of the Establishment clause with regards to
schools. That same proposals meets the main goals of the accomodationists; preserving
tradition, imparting moral values, maintaining states’ rights, and protecting the fi-ee
exercise of believers. Though it does not reach the ultimate goal of the separationists,
removing religion from the school entirely, it should quell arguments over direct state
involvement in religion and protection of the rights of non-believers. The policy of
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allowing communities to develop non-denominational, non-coercive prayer using a
citizen board and student volunteers seems to be the best compromise between the two
arguments.
The board could be organized by a vote at an open meeting, similar to a school
board meeting. What is obvious in this situation is that the extremes of the two sides of
the prayer debate will be at the meeting. Religious zealots from many denominations
will be in attendance in order to protect perceived rights or to steer the discussion,
deliberation and vote in a preferred direction. There is little doubt, at least in a diverse
community, that all sides could be well represented on a board of approximately ten
parents of students in the school, which is probably the smallest and most effective level
for this type of activity. In a less diverse community, followers of marginal religious
practices might be locked out of the process, even at the initial election stage, but their
right to testify at the meeting would not be infringed.
In order to establish “community consensus,” the vote of the board should have to
be a supermajority of 2/3, or 7 out of ten. This would insure that a convincing argument
of a dissenter would have a decent chance in toppling the proposed prayer, or that a
moderate amount of dissent by the board would be enough to push the prayer in a less
offensive direction or abolish it altogether. The supermajority would force greater
deliberation on content, style, tone, and delivery of the prayer in the school, and would
also serve as a means to dull zealotry by opening the discussion to many different points
of view. Those adamant that a prayer should be added might be swayed, by the
impassioned arguments of others, into believing that a private, sectarian prayer group
would be more appropriate for their children in that community. Others may decide that
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respect to other people’s beliefs in the community, including atheism and agnosticism,
would dictate much broader language than they would have originally intended.
Members of marginal faiths might be inclined to allow the activity if they were permitted
broad freedom in exempting their children.
The search here would e for fundamental truths that could bind the community
together rather than allowing the pull of religious dissension and zealotry to tear it apart.
If the community can come to no such consensus, perhaps the mere existence of the
board and the occurrence of the discussion will soften the divisions now being fed by
religious differences. As Jefferson wrote to Dr. Thomas Cooper,
In our annual report to the legislature, after stating the constitutional
reasons against a public establishment of any religious instruction, we
suggest the expediency of encouraging the different religious sects to
establish, each for itself, a professorship of their own tenets, on the
confines of the university, so near as that their students may attend the
lectures there, and have the free use of our library, and every other
accommodation we can give them; preserving, however, their
independence of us and of each other. This fills the chasm objected to
ours, as a defect in an institution professing to give instruction in all useful
sciences. I think the invitation will be accepted, by some sects from candid
intentions, and by others fi*omjealousy and rivalship. And by bringing the
sects together, and mixing them with the mass of other students, we shall
soften their asperities, liberalize and neutralize their prejudices, and make
the general religion a religion of peace, reason, and morality. (Jefferson
[1822]1984)
If no prayer results, perhaps the supporters will emerge more understanding of the
concerns of their fellow citizens. If a prayer results, perhaps dissenters, given their
opportunity to dissent respectfully, will retain a role in the overall religious debate and be
recognized, by the community in which they have chosen to live, as holding legitimate
beliefs worthy of expression at the least.
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Much of the Court’s current interpretation of the Establishment Clause includes a
choice factor. For example, the Court found in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (536 U.S.
639) that the voucher program in Ohio did not violate the Establishment Clause mainly
because the money was directed by parent choice and not by state assertion. The policy
of allowing a community review board to write the state prayer allows parent choice on a
community-wide level. An even broaden non-coercion doctrine than the one suggested by
the U.S. Court of Appeals in the Engel case would serve to create a second individual
choice on behalf of the parent or student in question. The lower court, in Engel, forced
the state to allow students to leave the room or to refrain from saying the prayer if a
parent requested such accommodations. Teachers were to refrain from commenting on
the students’ actions. (370 U.S. 421) Under the revised program students should be able
to refrain from saying the prayer without the burden of parental request, and teachers
would still be unable to comment. This would protect the rights of the non-believer or
the dissenter to be free from government coercion in religious matters. It would be
similar to the holding in West Virginia v. Barnette (319 U.S. 624), which allows students
to refrain from the Pledge of Allegiance without comment from teachers.
The Free Exercise rights of believers to take part in traditional, ceremonial
religious activity would be protected as well. Removing the teachers and administrators
from the process frees the state of any excessive entanglement, while allowing student
volunteers, selected, presumably, by the citizen board, would allow the students to
practice their religion freely. In the case of Westside Community Board o f Education v.
Mergens (496 U.S. 226), it was decided that students had the right to practice and study
religion on school campus to the same extent that non-religious groups and individuals
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could express their own beliefs on that same campus. The key to avoiding the
Establishment Clause issue in Mergens was to remove the school staff from the equation.
Just as teacher are to act merely as supervisors for Bible clubs, their roles would become
merely supervisory during the reading of the prayer. This also avoids a problem found in
Engel, which was that students might become indoctrinated by religious activities if the
person leading those activities was an authority figure. If the person leading the activity
is a peer, there is little danger of indoctrination. (370 U.S. 421)
The act of having the prayer written and regulated by a community board would
preserve the power of the states to set their own regulations and standards as well as the
original interpretation of the Establishment Clause by its Framers. (Peterson 1963) The
demographics of prayer supporters show that many of them live in concentrated areas,
especially in the South. (Green and Guth 1989) Those areas with high concentrations of
prayer supporters would be able to exercise their desire to have a brief, traditional,
ceremonial religious activity in the school. Those areas with high levels of separationists
would maintain the status quo. This would support the idea of a republican democracy
that rules in accordance with majority opinion and with respect to minority rights.
Some may still argue that there may be some perception of coercion amongst non
believers, but certainly, there is no Constitutional right against being offended. Under
this plan, the state would have to remain neutral and the prayer could not be overtly
coercive. More importantly, the rights of the minority must be balanced with those of the
majority. The majority would give up its right to be coercive or to be overtly
denominational, and the minority would have to be moderately tolerant of majority
traditions. If there is to be a check on the non-denominational and non-coercive nature of
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the prayers, it must be the Courts. Since the Court would have to overturn precedent in
order to allow this new plan to occur, it would have to establish a clear test for the nondenominational and non-coercive prayer so that prayers that violate this standard could
still be challenged in court.

Conclusion
Since 1963, the debate over school prayer has been highly contentious. As
Elifson and Hadaway wrote:
Prayer and Bible reading in Public schools have led to three major
Supreme Court decisions; they are the impetus for approximately 200
constitutional amendments in the U.S. Congress, amendments designed to
permit voluntary prayer in public schools or curtail federal court
jurisdiction in school prayer cases. (1985)
Of course, the battle has continued since 1985, and the Republican Party still devotes a
platform plank to a proposed school prayer amendment. (Janda 1999) As divisive as the
issue is, there still may be some middle ground to stake out, a compromise that might
satisfy some of the requirements of both sides. It is necessary to find this answer, and a
non-denominational, non-coercive, community-created prayer might be a step in that
direction. As the Court further develops the interpretation of the Establishment Clause in
relation to school prayer, perhaps they will happen on a definition of the clause that is
consistent, coherent, and adheres to the fundamental principles and traditions of the
United States government.
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